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Introduction 
 
 
There is a story from the Old Norse fornaldar [ancient times] sagas that 
tells of the rise of the sixth century Danish king Hrolf Kraki. The earliest 
versions are now lost to us, but the story, thought to be one of the possible 
sources for portions of the Anglo-Saxon Beowulf, survives through a large number 
of seventeenth century copies of fourteenth century manuscripts (Byock, vii, xxii, 
xxxi-xxxvi). Hrolf Kraki is one of the most famous of the Viking age kings, and 
for good reason. His saga describes the difficulties of rule in early medieval 
Scandinavia, the damage done by familial power struggles, and the triumph of 
good kingship over bad, all while immersing the reader in a world of legendary 
warriors and magic.   
 The story begins in the time of Hrolf’s grandfather, king Halfdan, and his 
great uncle, Frodi. Halfdan was mild-mannered and good-natured, whereas Frodi 
was harsh and greedy. So strong was the jealousy Frodi bore his brother, and so 
strong was his treacherous nature that he killed Halfdan. He then seized all of 
Denmark, thus robbing his young nephews Hroar and Helgi of their birthright. 
The boys escaped and hid from Frodi in the homes of various nobles until they 
were grown. Like their father and uncle, the young princes had disparate natures; 
Hroar was mild and easygoing, whereas Helgi, a staunch warrior, was vengeful. 
Once they were strong enough, the sons of Halfdan gathered their nobles and 
took back their birthright by burning Frodi in his great hall. Helgi took the 
Danish throne, and Hroar went over the sea to Northumberland, where he 
reigned until his death.  
 King Helgi’s warlike nature caught up with him, and he was killed on 
campaign by the Swedish king, Adils. Helgi’s wife Yrsa was forced to remain in 
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Sweden, but their son Hrolf escaped back to Denmark. In doing so he lost he 
much of his inheritance (Hrolf, 8-24). Hrolf, while king of Denmark, began to 
gather the champions of rival clans. They were drawn to his reputation as a 
worthy king. Svipdag, a champion from Adils’ court, had heard of Hrolf and 
decided to leave his former master. Unsure he was making the right decision, he 
asked his father for advice. The old man answered him, saying:   
I have heard King Hrolf is open-handed and generous and so trustworthy 
and particular about his friends that his equal cannot be found. He 
withholds neither gold nor treasure from nearly everyone who wants or 
needs them. He is handsome in looks, powerful in deeds and a worthy 
opponent. The fairest of men, Hrolf is fierce with the greedy, yet gentle 
and accommodating with the unpretentious and modest. Towards all 
those who do not threaten him, he is the most humble of men, responding 
with equal mildness to both the powerful and the poor. Hrolf is so great 
that his name will not be forgotten as long as the world remains inhabited. 
(Hrolf, 31)   
Hrolf was a good king, whereas Adils was greedy and came about his wealth 
dishonorably. So, the young warrior joined a new master. Eventually, Svipdag 
convinced Hrolf to engage Adils in negotiations to take back his inheritance. 
When Hrolf and his men arrived in Sweden, Adils gave them a poor welcome by 
ordering his men to, “Cut off the tails of their horses to the rump, and cut the 
forelocks in such a way that the skin on the forehead peels off. Treat them in all 
ways with as much ridicule as you can. Just leave them barely alive” (Hrolf, 58). As 
if this weren’t humiliation enough, Hrolf and his men narrowly escaped being 
burnt alive in the great hall. Eventually, Hrolf had suffered enough dishonor and 
forced Adils into battle. Although Adils was a capable warrior, he was forced to 
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cede the inheritance and retreat after receiving an epic stroke to his buttocks 
(Hrolf, 33, 53-56).  
 The story of Hrolf Kraki is separated from my primary texts by 
considerable time and space, but there are many ties between them. Hrolf’s saga 
perfectly sums up the tensions and rewards of good kingship versus bad kingship 
that pervaded not just Scandinavia, but medieval Europe as a whole. Its ties to 
Beowulf make this especially prescient in the Anglo-Saxon context, but the rest of 
Western Europe was no stranger to this type of epic. Although the systems of 
lordship in sixth century Denmark and Sweden differed from those of twelfth 
century France and England, the primary concerns of the saga are telling. Hrolf 
Kraki was a good king, described above as knowing when to behave fiercely and 
when to behave humbly, whose moderation bore him many rewards, as well as his 
entry into legend. In the paper that follows, I will show how twelfth century 
writings contend with many of the same questions, among them, what makes a 
good king and what happens when a king is bad?  
My primary texts, which span roughly one hundred and twenty years, 
include a work of epic poetry, one of political didacticism, and one of the most 
influential legal documents in Western history. I will begin with Raoul de 
Cambrai, a chanson de geste from the twelfth century cycle of the rebellious barons. 
I will then discuss John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, a political and philosophical 
treatise written in the late 1150s, followed by the first version of Magna Carta. 
Although these texts are not contemporaneous in the strictest sense of the term, 
like Hrolf’s saga, they are all good examples of the attitudes towards rule, 
kingship, and social responsibility in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. I 
will argue that differing opinions with regard to the power and duties of the king 
vis à vis his people, as well as the power and duties of the landed nobility in the 
ever-changing social order is manifested through each of my primary texts. It is 
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true that differences between the types of texts represented, as well as 
differences between their intended audiences makes comparing the ways this 
confusion is expressed a complex task. Yet, I will demonstrate that all three show 
an interconnectedness of purpose. I also aim to show that through a combined 
study of these texts, we are able to identify problems of governance and 
autonomy as they were seen in their own time, and that we are able to track the 
progression from political thought and desire to action. Although the Raoul de 
Cambrai, the Policraticus, and Magna Carta are not linked in any empirical way, 
they are in conversation with one another through the social movements, values, 
and anxieties that lead to their composition. My contention is that the 
difficulties of governance put to verse in the Raoul are tied to the ideas expressed 
in the Policraticus, and that it is these same difficulties that the provisions of 
Magna Carta sought to alter. It is perhaps not the easiest leap to take considering 
the seemingly disparate nature of the style of the texts, but I ask the reader to 
maintain l’esprit ouvert as I elucidate my theory in the paper that follows. It may 
also seem odd to the reader that I should treat one text of French provenance 
and two of English provenance as though they came from the same place. True, 
the Angevin empire is not Capetian France, and to this I answer that both of the 
documents composed in the English context were written under Angevin kings 
active on the continent, and whose nobles and clerics also had ample access to 
the courts, curias, and universities of France. As I have shown above, and will 
continue to show in the chapters that follow, the shared history, similarities in 
systems of rule, as well as sheer physical proximity of territory all justify my 
comparison.   
 I would also like to note that in the cases of the Policraticus and Magna 
Carta, scholarship has been limited to that of political scientists, legal scholars, 
and historians. There has been precious little, if any, study of the literary and 
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performative qualities of these texts, which seems to me a rather egregious 
oversight. True, the legal and historical implications are a perfectly natural first 
point of entry into such works, but their value should not be limited to these 
assessments. The language, style, dissemination, and reception of such texts are 
too often ignored in favor of the seemingly harder science of legal history. I 
believe that a comparative, rhetorical approach to Policraticus and Magna Carta 
may give some insight into certain previously unexamined aspects of these texts. 
I am particularly interested in examining how the lexical sets and rhetorical 
devices used in each text serve to influence reception and modes of circulation. I 
will also devote some time to investigating how stylistic and typological 
differences in the three texts serves to either widen or narrow the scope of 
potential audiences, and whether there is overlap in the reach of these 
individually, and as a whole.   
As all three texts are concerned with defining the role of the king, 
whether by laying out the precepts for good rule, by giving examples of bad rule, 
or by attempting to limit kingly power, it is imperative to first examine kingship 
as it existed in England and France in the twelfth and very early thirteenth 
centuries. When reading about the medieval period from a modern perspective, 
it is important to avoid applying the highly codified systems of kingship that 
came about in later periods. The twelfth century was a period of transition 
between the confusion and chaos of earlier centuries and the versions of kingship 
that appeared in the Renaissance period that are so familiar to us. This was, as 
Björn Weiler has described it, a period where regionalism was giving way to the 
rising nationalism of both boundaries and rule. Norman rule had only been 
established in England in the last half of the eleventh century, and the Capetians, 
who had been in power on the continent since the late tenth century and only 
controlled West Francia, were engaged in near-constant border struggles with the 
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Holy Roman Empire on their eastern borders (92). The loss of the order 
established by Charlemagne in the late eight and early ninth centuries caused 
anxiety across his former realms, especially as the counts of Anjou and Flanders 
waged wars of aggressive and ambitious expansion. This was also a time marked 
by great inconsistencies in the practices of governance; some rulers were 
extremely effective, while others lived with the reality that neither their dynasties 
nor their positions guaranteed their continued control (Bisson, Crisis, 23-27, 33-34, 
129, 142-143). With the rise of the great European powers there was considerable 
confusion as to where the king’s power originated, and to what degree this should 
be encouraged or limited by the papacy.  
In writing this paper, I have struggled with the role of the divine that so 
deeply pervades the practices of medieval kingship and the absence of the brand 
of Divine Right that solidifies in the Renaissance. Whereas in later centuries the 
ruler was believed to have been handpicked by God and was thus the earthly 
incarnation of the will of Heaven, the role of the divine in the selection of 
medieval kings is much less clear. The idea that kingship was in some capacity 
divinely inspired was neither original to the Renaissance, nor to the medieval 
period. In fact, the idea of the divinity of kingship was present in Egypt and 
continued to develop much further in the Roman world, most notably in the 
deification of the Caesars. Many of the rituals and practices associated with 
pagan antiquity would reappear in lightly altered forms throughout the centuries 
following the fall of the Roman Empire, including elements of the Roman 
triumph in coronation rites and the images of rulers on coinage, a place once 
reserved for images of the gods. Several animals that were once used during 
triumphal sacrifices became the heraldic and metaphoric symbols of medieval 
kings, among them the bull and the boar (Bertelli, 10-11, 66-67, 114, 118). 
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 Scholarship on medieval incarnations of divine right, overwhelmingly 
conducted by legal scholars with limited interest in the literary and cultural 
depiction of kingship, seems to have ceased almost entirely by the first half of the 
twentieth century. There has been some recent scholarship on divinity as part of 
performative kingship, notably the work of Sergio Bertelli, and I have chosen to 
focus my energies there. Ernst Kantorowicz also managed to touch on both sides 
of these schools in his seminal work The King’s Two Bodies, published in 1956. His 
work focuses on differentiations between the body politic and the body natural 
of the king, which has provided a necessary framework both for scholars of 
medieval kingship and for this paper. I have also consulted Fritz Kern’s studies 
on the divine right of kings; which, while focused on the Germanic world, has 
proven useful in framing the beginnings of medieval legal practice and in 
negotiating the divine nature of the ruler from the Franks up through the later 
medieval period.    
 Perhaps the most striking intervention of the divine in medieval kingship 
is the practice of consecrating the new monarch through anointing with holy oil 
that remains central to coronation rites even to this day. The type of anointing 
seen in the medieval period harkens back to that of the Old Testament kings 
through the same rituals used to anoint priests. This is significant as a ritual 
means of legitimizing the office and person of the king, and as a means to 
legitimize the position of the church as a counterbalance to the monarchy 
(Bertelli, 177). The consecration of the king by the clergy (and vice-versa) created 
mediating points between the people, the clergy, and the king. Perhaps more 
importantly, consecration by anointing changed the prince into a new man by 
making him an adoptive son of God, and by conferring on him the gifts of the 
Holy Ghost. The consecrated monarch was given a quality that the church could 
not undo, which became legally significant because once the true ruler was 
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sanctioned by the church he could not be similarly un-sanctioned (Kern, 27-29, 
37-38). 
 It is also important to note that, unlike later incarnations of divine right 
that asserted the king’s individual selection by God, these earlier societies tended 
to prefer a more dynastic approach. Families were singled out as being 
particularly worthy and the individual’s worth was not necessarily dictated by 
order of birth within the dynasty. Certain lines, like the Capetian monarchs, were 
said to be blessed with thaumaturgical abilities; including, but not limited to the 
healing by touch of illnesses like scrofula (Bertelli, 26 and Kern, 59).1 In a similar 
vein, these earlier incarnations of divine right also make great distinctions 
between the body natural of the king and his body politic. The king himself is a 
man, made sacerdos (priest) through ritual consecration, but representations of his 
body in art and literature give his body in office a sacral quality. This is perhaps 
most strikingly demonstrated in works like the tenth century Aachen (or Liuthar) 
gospels where the king is shown in majesty with a divine hand reaching down as if 
to bless his crown.2 This is not the only manuscript to show a ruler as a Christ 
figure, rather, similar images can also be found in the ninth century Vivian bible 
and Codex aureus (Kantorowicz, 61-63, 76). It is in much the same vein that the 
biblical kings of Judea were carved into the façade of the cathedral at Reims. The 
implication that the monarchs crowned within descended from these early kings, 
either in body or in spirit, would have been lost on no one.3 These symbolic 
representations of the king in what Bertelli calls christomimèsis, or imitation of the 
Christ, serve to imply, at the very least, the divinity of the king’s office (6,21, 139). 
While I do not wish to draw too hard a line under these depictions, I do think 
                                                            
1 Scrofula is now considered to be akin to tuberculosis of the neck. See: The Oxford Dictionary of 
the Middle Ages. 
2 Ernst Kantorowicz refers to these as the gospels of Otto II, where other sources claim the 
emperor depicted is his son, Otto III. 
3 Reims was the site of coronations as early as the eleventh century, though construction of the 
new cathedral was begun circa 1211. See: The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages. 
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that scholarship up to this point has somewhat ignored the progression from 
these christomimèses and implied ancestries to the Renaissance incarnations of 
Divine Right. It remains clear to me that there is some measure of divine 
selection or intervention in the rituals of medieval kingship as manifested 
through cultural output. The twelfth century king was not merely a man, though 
not yet a god, and the questions surrounding the sources of his power will come 
to bear heavily on my analysis of the Raoul de Cambrai, the Policraticus, and Magna 
Carta in the chapters that follow.         
Now that I have shown the place of the king in the medieval universe, it is 
logical that a discussion of his relationship to his vassals should follow. Given that 
the three texts this paper proposes to examine are centered largely on just this 
relationship, understanding its mechanics is of the utmost importance. The 
power structures of the twelfth century were based on a series of interwoven 
hierarchical lord-vassal relationships that cannot and should not be 
oversimplified. These relationships were complex, and the subject of much 
confusion, especially where questions of heredity, inheritance, and fealty were 
concerned. The three texts I have chosen, as we will see in the following 
chapters, are testament to these difficulties. Before entering into that discussion, 
however, I would like to take a moment to discuss the structure of lordship as it 
existed in Capetian France and in Angevin England with a view to identifying the 
sociopolitical problems that came to bear on the Raoul de Cambrai, the Policraticus, 
and Magna Carta.  
 Lordship across twelfth century Western Europe had an almost identical 
structure and, while it did not manifest in exactly the same way in each country, 
the similarities are strong enough and consistent enough for me to speak 
generally. The medieval world, as I have said above, was one of top-down 
hierarchies. As Thomas Bisson explains in The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 
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“Lordship matters because the human realities of power – command, allegiance, 
accountability, coercion, and violence – were bound up with it. Few can have 
envied people without lords in these times” (34). Lords were necessary, as was the 
loose administrative structure within which they existed both for the limited 
sense of order they created and for the security they were able to provide against 
external powers. Like a sort of medieval protection racket, violence was an ever-
present threat from all sides, but the functionality of the system also required the 
participation of the subordinate classes (in this case, vassals and the peasantry).  
 Modern readers sometimes conflate the medieval period with visions of a 
feudal monolith with precious little social or political sophistication. In analyzing 
the Raoul, the Policraticus, and Magna Carta, this view would do all three texts a 
great disservice. John F. Benton, for example, argues that what earlier scholarship 
called the feudal period spanning the eighth to the thirteenth centuries should be 
actually be divided into two major ages (using Bloch), and three overlapping 
periods each with its own system. Benton explains: 
In terms of the power of government, either on the level of kingdom or  
principality, these three periods are commonly seen as representing first a  
move from strength to weakness or from centralization to localism,  
decentralization and indeed ‘feudal anarchy’, and then a second shift back  
to centralizing power, a time of construction of principalities as well as of  
the strengthening of monarchy…” (276) 
This movement towards disorder followed by another towards order and strong 
monarchies is key to the central themes of all three of my primary texts; where, 
as we will see, conflicts of power do not benefit the common good. This does not 
mean, however, that the structure of baronial power ceded all rights to the king. 
Power seems to have instead been organized in a series of concentric circles with 
the king at the center, for better or worse.     
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 While Kern asserts that, “The powerful and energetic kings of the Middle 
ages did, in fact, rule more or less absolutely” they still had to contend with a 
large number of increasingly powerful barons whose interests challenged the 
order of these early cults of kingly personality (81). This meant that the king did 
not have unlimited rights and, conversely, that his subjects were endowed with 
certain limited rights of resistance. However, this right of resistance did not 
preempt the systems of fealty present in this period – as long as the king 
exercised his rule in good faith, his barons were still bound to him by their oaths 
(Kern, 83, 87). As we will see, all three of my primary texts are explicitly 
concerned with what constitutes this good faith of rule, as well as what the 
necessary steps should be when a king has acted in ways that call his good faith 
into question. Furthermore, despite a movement towards centralization, the 
structure of lordship during the centuries in question was still overwhelmingly 
regional with the added implication that kings could not annul preexisting 
provincial laws. Vassals of the king were also bound to each other by fealty, which 
wreaked havoc when competing claims brought the oath swearers into conflict. 
As Bisson explains: 
Political realities dictated alliances between the king and one or more of  
the major vassals, not the harmonious solidarity idealized (and perhaps  
lamented) by the Roland  poet… If the king was to establish his right to  
reliefs, wardships, and aids over great fiefs it would have to be by favorable 
 political circumstances (as in Flanders in 1128) or by dint of intermarriage  
(Champagne, 1160), but above all by the energetic prosecution of Justice...  
(Medieval France, 249, 254) 
 
 In order to address these questions of rule, right, and governance, I have 
elected to discuss each text separately in chronological order by date of 
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composition. I will begin by engaging in a close reading of the Raoul de Cambrai 
with a view to teasing out the tensions arising between the king and his barons 
through questions of heredity. I will examine how we are able to use the 
interactions between its characters to identify contemporary attitudes towards 
rule and governance, as well as the desire to move in the direction of new systems 
of rule. My second chapter will focus on John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, where I 
will engage with the author’s rhetorical systems of contradiction and binaries, as 
well as his use of exempla as a didactic tool. I will also engage with John’s 
theoretical approaches to good rule, tyrants, and tyrannicide both in the context 
of his day and through his invocation of antiquity. My third chapter will start 
with a summation of the circumstances leading to the sealing of Magna Carta, and 
will continue on, again through close reading of the text, to identify how it 
proposes solutions to the questions of rule and governance identified in the Raoul 
and the Policraticus. I will also engage with the charter as a genre as a means to 
dictate a new model of social responsibility that pulls power from the king, and 
that creates new ties to memory through documentation. My fourth chapter will 
divert slightly from the previous three as I seek to discover how modes of 
circulation, medieval reading practices, and performance impacted contemporary 
reception of my three primary texts. Through this, I will be able to discuss how 
writing practices are related to the transmission and preservation of conflict and 
desire with particular attention paid to their impact on the politics of the day 
seen from our time. I will conclude this paper by putting my three primary texts 
into conversation with each other through John of Salisbury’s theory of the body 
politic with a view to tracking the cultural implications of interactions between 
literature, performance, and law.  
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It All Goes Wrong: Rule and Inheritance in Raoul de Cambrai 
 
  In this section I will discuss the provenance, composition, and linguistic 
values of the Raoul de Cambrai for the purpose of better understanding how it can 
be read as an expression of political desire. In writing this portion of my thesis I 
owe much to Sarah Kay, whose work on the Raoul manuscripts through her 
critical edition of the text and numerous articles is very complete and provides 
much of the backbone necessary for my analysis. I will begin by discussing the 
extant manuscripts of the Raoul de Cambrai; first, their actual makeup, then, the 
conditions within which the scribes may have been working, and finally, what can 
be said about the poets and scribes that contributed to them. I will then establish 
the basic content of the text with regard to narrative, before moving into a close 
reading of several passages from the text in the hopes of identifying the manner 
by which its political positions are expressed.  
  The Raoul de Cambrai as we know it exists in three manuscripts, of which 
only one is considered complete. The first and most complete is held by the 
Bibliothèque nationale de France. This manuscript, which Kay refers to as Ms A, 
consists of 150 folios (of which fos. 2-5 show considerable damage) and was copied 
by two scribes over the course of the thirteenth century. Ms A consists of 8543 
lines, of which some are rhymed and some of which use assonance. It is also this 
manuscript that will provide the passages used for analysis in the remaining parts 
of this chapter. The second manuscript, hereafter referred to as Ms B, consists of 
approximately 250 rhymed lines copied and commented by the historian and 
antiquarian Claude Fauchet in 1555. The third, and final manuscript, which Kay 
calls Ms C, are two fragments held by the Bibliothèque royale de Belgique. Ms C, 
also dated to the thirteenth century contains approximately 294 rhymed lines. In 
the introduction to her critical edition of Raoul de Cambrai, Kay posits that Ms A 
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and Ms C are the product of a common ancestor, now lost to us (ix-x, xviii-xxi, 
xxvi).   
Before entering into my close reading, it may prove useful to the reader to 
be given a summary of the action of the Raoul. The poem opens with a customary 
exhortation to Oiez chançon [Listen to a song] (line 1) common to many chansons de 
geste, before being given a premonition of the violence to follow, as is also fairly 
common to the chansons of this nature.  
  Following years of faithful service to the king, the mighty and warlike 
Raoul Taillefer [Ironsides] has died of old age. His widow, the beautiful Aalais, 
sister of the king, has given birth to a son, the titular Raoul de Cambrai. For 
some years and months,4 mother and son live happily in the Cambrésis with the 
child’s paternal uncle, Guerri the Red5 who is count of Arras. Meanwhile, the 
young and ambitious Giboin du Mans has been serving the king well and seeks 
recompense. King Louis, after consulting with his barons, cedes Taillefer’s lands 
in the Cambrésis to Giboin, thus disinheriting his young nephew, Raoul. Louis, 
again following the enthusiastic advice of his barons, also agrees that his sister 
Aalais should marry the young knight, despite her wishes to the contrary. These 
actions provide the impetus for the violent confrontations that will mark the 
remainder of the narrative, although Louis does seem cognizant of the potential 
for dispute, and makes Giboin promise to return the lands once the baby Raoul 
comes of age.    
 Counting on this fulfillment of this promise, Raoul later presents himself 
at Louis’s court and requests that his father’s lands be returned to him. For a 
variety of possible reasons, and following several fits of temper, Louis refuses to 
remove the Cambrésis from Giboin’s control. Conscious that he must offer his 
                                                            
4 The number of years and months are indeterminate due to the damage to fo 2b. Using Ms C, 
Kay inserts “as many as three?” into her translation.  
5 Laisse XII of Ms B describes Guerri as frere d’Aelis, which could cause some confusion as to who 
is related to whom. However, frere can refer also to a brother by blood, by alliance, or by marriage.  
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nephew something, he instead offers Raoul the lands of the first baron to die de ci 
q’en Vermandois, / d’Aiz la Chapele deci en Cellentois, / de Monloon deci en Ollenois [from 
here to the Vermandois, from Aix-la-Chapelle as far as Senlis, from Laon as far as 
Orléans] (lines 559-561) entre Loire et le Rin [from the Loire to the Rhine] (line 
590).6 Raoul accepts this, and forty hostages as a guarantee, though he won’t have 
long to wait. A year later, the very well landed Hébert of Vermandois dies, and 
Raoul rides off to claim his lands. Louis, not wishing to run afoul of Hébert’s four 
sons, again refuses to fulfill his promise. Thus begins the first in a series of violent 
encounters as Raoul masses an army and marches on the city of Origny.  
 While in Origny, Raoul commits his cardinal sin – his attempts to 
disinherit Hébert’s sons of their lands being justified by the king, he proceeds to 
order the sack of Origny, resulting in a large number of nuns being burnt alive 
(one of whom is Marsent, the mother of Raoul’s vassal Bernier). This unspeakable 
act sets a rift between Raoul and the young Bernier, who eventually, following 
several explosive encounters, kills his former liege in a duel. The story continues 
on to treat the issues surrounding Raoul’s death, and the inheritance of his own 
nephew, Gautier. Bernier and Gautier engage in a duel to decide whether Raoul 
was killed legally or not. The result of the duel is inconclusive, and sentiments 
against Louis begin to shift as his actions are identified as the ultimate cause of 
his nephew Raoul’s death. These negative feelings against the king are only 
exacerbated when he refuses to allow Ybert, one of the sons of Hébert de 
Vermandois, to name his illegitimate son, the same Bernier, as his heir.  
 Gautier has been gravely injured in the duel, and Bernier becomes the 
focus of the text. The rival clans, brought together by a mutual hatred of the 
king, agree that Bernier should marry Guerri the Red’s daughter Beatrice. Louis, 
however, has other plans that will cause the central conflict of the final section of 
                                                            
6 Translations from the Old French are mine unless otherwise noted and were done using the text 
edited by Kay.  
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Raoul de Cambrai, and as the story comes to its ending, an entire generation of 
men is wiped out with the unsettling insinuation that the violence will only 
continue on in this style as their heirs come of age.  
 There have been many suppositions made as to the historicity of Raoul de 
Cambrai, many of which are entirely plausible, and some which are perhaps not. 
As William Kibler notes in his introduction to the text, “Tous les critiques sont plus 
ou moins d’accord pour y voir le reflet d’une lutte quasi permanente au cours des IXe et Xe 
siècles – voir au XIIe encore! – pour la possession du Vermandois, mais l’identification des 
personnages épiques avec des figures de l’histoire a fait couler beaucoup d’encre” [Critics 
more or less agree on the text’s reflection of a near permanent struggle for the 
possession of the Vermandois over the course of the ninth and tenth – even the 
twelfth! – centuries, though the identification of the epic characters with 
historical figures has caused the flow of much ink] (17). The primary difficulty, for 
those seeking to assign historical personages to the story, is the expanse of time 
that exists between the supposed geneses of the story itself, and the genesis of 
the extant manuscript. The manuscript, as we have seen above, roughly 
corresponds to the later years of Louis VII, and the early years of his son Philip 
II Augustus, the overlap of which is not insignificant. They do not, however, 
match up with the events of the narrative, so much as the baronial strife their 
reigns would provoke. The struggles in superimposing a historical basis for the 
text, to which Kibler refers above, are further explained by Kay in the 
introduction to her edition, and by the editors of the seminal 19th century 
edition, Paul Meyer and Auguste Lognon. Both of these editions (and Kibler’s by 
extension) point to two historical Raouls, whose exploits could have formed the 
basis for Raoul de Cambrai; the one a subject of Louis IV d’Outremer, the other of 
Odo of Paris (Kay, lviii and Meyer and Longnon, xvj-xvij, xxj, xxxj).  
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 It is interesting to note that while Meyer and Lognon do not mention him 
at all, Kay and Kibler are both insistent that the text provides commentary on 
the reign of Philip Augustus. However, where Kay is more keen to push the text 
towards criticism of Philip Augustus, Kibler is more apt to hint towards a less 
hard and fast representation: 
Le veritable scélérat de notre poème, la cause primordiale de tous les malheurs et 
l’instigateur de la guerre entre Cambrésiens et Vermandois n’est autre que l’empereur 
Louis, personnage composite, inspiré par plusieurs rois carolingiens, notamment Louis 
Ier le Pieux (814-840), Louis II le Bègue (877-879) et Louis IV d’Outremer (936-954), 
sans parler de Philippe Auguste lui-même.  
[The real villain of our poem, the essential cause of all misfortune and the 
instigator of the war between the Cambrésiens and the Vermandois is none 
other than the Emperor Louis, a composite character inspired by several 
Carolingian kings, notably Louis I the Pious, Louis II the Stammerer, and 
Louis IV Transmarinus, not to mention Philip Augustus himself.] (20) 
The composite king mentioned by Kibler provides a perfect compliment to the 
composite nature of the text of Raoul de Cambrai itself, as Kay demonstrates in 
her critical edition.  
 The first, and perhaps most obvious aspect of this composite nature are 
the scribal differences which Kay and others have described. Two scribes, both 
working on opposite ends of the thirteenth century have been identified and the 
nature of their collaboration appears to be more a question of accident than what 
Kay calls “planned cooperation”. Scribe one is responsible for folios 2-102b, 
whereas Scribe two is responsible for the first folio and for folios 103 through the 
end of the poem. The different scribes are identifiable by a change in the number 
of lines per page, as well as signs of haste and the relative messiness of the script 
in Scribe two’s portions of the manuscript (Kay ix, xi-xii). What may have caused 
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this change in scribes, and the haste of the second is unknown to us, as is the 
ownership of the manuscript prior to its being received into the collections of the 
Bibliothèque nationale in 1683 (Kay, xviii). For the purpose of this chapter, I am 
especially interested in what Kay and others have identified as changes in poet in 
key parts of the text.  
 Based largely on the shift from rhymed lines to assonance lines occurring 
around line 5374, Kay has divided the Raoul into two sections, R1 and R2, and 
treats these as being the work of two distinct poets (xxvii). The narrative is also 
customarily broken down into three sections, bearing the names of their main 
protagonists: Raoul (lines 1-3560), Gautier (lines 3561-5374), and Bernier (line 5375 
through the end at line 8453).7 The R1 poet is then responsible for the Raoul and 
Gautier sections, whereas the R2 poet is responsible for the Bernier section. 
Whereas the shifts from one protagonist to another are fairly straightforward, 
the R1 and R2 distinctions are not quite so simple. The poets of R1 and R2 both 
use words belonging to Northern dialects, Picard and Francien, making it 
difficult to differentiate between them on any linguistic basis with the exception 
of certain words being used more often in the one than the other (Kay xxvii-xxxi). 
Kay also posits that the Raoul section may be the work of an even earlier poet 
that has been recast into rhymed lines by the poet responsible for the Gautier 
section (xlv). If Kay is correct in her assertion, we may consider Raoul de Cambrai 
to be the work of three poets and two scribes all working over a period of 
approximately two hundred years. The presence of these two, and possibly three 
authors, as well as the lack of any other complete manuscripts for comparison 
might be seen to rather muddy the waters of any serious analysis of the processes 
by which an author expresses any kind of desire through narrative. For my 
purposes, the presence of multiple authors and scribes over such a period of time 
                                                            
7 These are the divisions that Kay lays out and there seems to be little or no disagreement on the 
part of other scholars as to their correctness.  
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may prove more useful than damaging. Through their linguistic choices I will be 
able to track the changing attitudes to rule, baronial autonomy, and the 
emergence of legal precedent that are present in the text.  
I have begun by selecting passages that highlight the attitudes towards 
their king, Louis, both of the poets, and of the characters that inhabit the world 
of the Raoul. If the purpose of this chapter is to expose and analyze issues of 
governance, rule, and just kingship as they present themselves in the chansons de 
geste, it seems logical to begin at the top of the hierarchy of lordship and work our 
way down. The first passages follow the young Raoul’s initial disinheritance and 
are rather transparent as to the attitudes towards the king’s decision. The work 
of the R1 poet, they consist largely of rhymed lines containing 10 syllables per 
line. 
 
Rois Loeys fist le jor grant foliage 
qe son neveu toli son eritaige; 
et Giboin refist molt grant outraige  
qant autrui terre vost avoir par barna[ige] –  
puis en fus mors a duel et a hontaig[e] (lines 135-139) 
 
[King Louis committed great folly the day he took his nephew’s birthright 
away from him, and Giboin committed a great outrage when he desired 
another’s lands as repayment for his deeds – then he died with suffering 
and shame]  
 
This first passage is taken from one of the damaged folios, and so some of 
the lines have been reconstituted by Kay using Ms C. Unlike in later passages, 
here the king is simply Rois Loeys. He isn’t given any epithet indicating his 
inherent justice, force, or power. Rather, the opposite is true; the king’s actions 
are characterized as foliage, which in turn leads to Giboin’s outraige. The use of the 
verb tolir indicates a removal, which in turn implies that the land was perhaps 
already owned through inheritance right. This choice of verb serves to ramp up 
the reader’s emotions in favor of the young Raoul and against the king, who 
behaves irrationally. Further, although having conceded that Giboin had served 
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the king well and was perhaps deserving of recompense, the poet insists that he 
was greedy for wanting the land of another and that his death was deserved in 
some capacity.   
 
Nostre empereres esploita mallement 
de Cambresis saisi le tenement 
Et au Mensel en fi saisissement. (lines 176.v-vii) 
 
[Our emperor behaved badly when he seized the Cambrésis and gave it 
over to the one from Le Mans]  
 
These lines from Ms B, which Sarah Kay has edited into her critical 
edition, characterize the king as having behaved badly [esploita mallement] both in 
delighting in the seizure of [saisi le tenement] the Cambrésis and in giving the 
seized lands over to Giboin of Le Mans [au Mansel en fi saisissement]. These uses of 
a verb indicating seizure are much stronger than the use of tolir above, which 
merely indicates a removal. This is important as it stresses the injustice done by 
both parties in passing the ownership of lands already owned to a third party. 
Louis is referred to here not by his name as before, but as nostre empereres. In 
much the same way, the shift from the use of Giboin’s given name, to le Mansel is 
significant. Both men are alluded to by epithet, thus depersonalizing the act as if 
the lands were taken not by human men, but rather by the symbolic holders of 
these positions. The fragment is too small to support broad conclusions, but it is 
clear that the poet whose lines were copied down by Fauchet can be said to 
display a similar attitude, towards this act of disinheritance as the R1 poet of Ms 
A – similar enough, anyway, for Kay to include it in her critical edition, and for 
Kibler to keep it in his contemporary French translation.   
Returning to Ms A, a clear indication is given of how this seizure of the 
young Raoul’s lands by Giboin du Mans is seen by his kinsman. The lines below 
consist of a direct address by Raoul’s paternal uncle Guerri the Red to Raoul’s 
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maternal uncle King Louis, in which the political implications of baronial 
autonomy versus the power of the crown are displayed in full force.  
Drois empereres, ne le vos qier celer, 
s’en Cambrisis puet mais ester t[rové] 
seürs puet ester de la teste colpe[r]. 
Et vos, fox rois, on vos en doit blasme[r]( lines 184-187) 
 
[Just emperor, I don’t wish to hide this from you. If he is found in the 
Cambrésis, his (Giboin du Mans’) head will surely be cut off. And you, 
false/bad king, would be to blame.]  
 
Guerri refers to the king as his drois empereres, but does not shrink from 
criticizing his actions, nor from openly threatening Giboin. Furthermore, it is 
extremely odd to pass from “just emperor” as a polite form of address to “false 
king” as an admonition in the space of four lines. Is Guerri’s willingness to openly 
engage the king a reflection on his own power, a mark of insanity, or a comment 
on the weakness of the king? If Louis’s kingship is seen as being bestowed upon 
him by God, as I will later discuss, what can be said of the frequency with which 
he is criticized, publicly and privately, throughout the text?  
Following these criticisms, it is interesting to note the concessions the 
king makes in an attempt to keep the peace, or at the very least mitigate the 
potential for violence. In this following passage from Ms A, we are told what 
guarantees are given to Raoul by Louis as a means to satisfy his desire to inherit 
lands without angering Giboin by handing over the Cambrésis.  
Li empereres a la fiere puissanse 
quarante ostaiges li livra en oiance, 
par tel couve[n]t con dirai la samblance : 
qe ce quens muert en Vermandois n’en France, 
qe de la terre, qui q’il tourt a pesance, 
li fera il el païs delivrance, 
ja n’i perdra nes le fer d’une lance. 
Puis l’en failli par sa demesurance ; 
Maint gentil home torna puis a pesance – 
tuit il ostaige en furent en balance. (lines 619-628) 
 
[The emperor of formidable power openly gave him forty hostages as an 
expression of this covenant: that whichever count should die in 
theVermandois or in France, his lands, regardless of who should suffer 
from it, the land and its people would be delivered to him without even 
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the loss of the iron of a lance. But later he would renege, because of lack 
of restraint, and many noble men would suffer, as all of these hostages 
would be in danger.]   
 
Here again, the R1 poet reacts to the king’s behavior in terms that leave little 
ambiguity. Here Louis is neither referred to by his given name, nor as nostre, but 
as the emperor. I am interested in the impact of the qualification of this power as 
fiere in this portion of the laisse, as well as those that follow. If fiere can be taken 
here to mean not only great or impressive, but also savage and cruel, then this is a 
king whose power takes on an aspect which is necessarily problematic. Louis has 
offered up forty hostages as a guarantee that he will further cede the lands of the 
first baron to die en Vermandois n’en France in order to appease his nephew. These 
hostages, being subject to a power that is both immense and cruel [fiere puissanse], 
are led into danger and suffering by the king’s lack of moderation [demesurance]. 
As we will see later on, Raoul is also marked by a great deal of demesure, or lack of 
restraint. The king’s lack of restraint begets a lack of restraint on his nephew’s 
part, and the cycles of disorder take over the narrative from this point on. For, in 
this case, demesure foreshadows disorder; disorderly behavior, disorderly rule, and 
ultimately, a disorderly kingdom. There will be no going back as the land grab 
prompted by Giboin passes through Raoul and begins to impact more and more 
of Louis’s nobles. The king does make some attempts to rein in the mounting 
tensions between the families implicated by the land disputes.  In the following 
passage from the Gautier section, we are given a glimpse into the workings of 
Louis’s court. He has called his vassals together, and we discover that they 
number 30,000 men [trente mil fu le jor aesmee]. He then, through his seneschal, 
orders that there be peace at the gathering, threatening anyone who should break 
it with a speedy beheading.    
 
Nostre empereres a sa gent asamblee; 
a trente mil fu le jor aesmee […] 
‘Oiés, signor, franche gent honoree, 
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q(e)ele parole vos a li rois mandee: 
n’i a celui , c’il fait çains meslee, 
qe ains le vesper n’ait la teste colpee!’ (lines 4613-4623) 
 
[Our emperor called his nobles together – There were thirty thousand of 
them that day … “Listen, my lords, my nobles, to the message the king has 
sent you: There will be no man who quarrels here that before vespers will 
not lose his head!]  
 
This passage occurs much later than the ones we have seen before, and my reason 
for including it is that outside of the occasional mention of the various fiefs 
controlled by his vassals, this is the first time we are given the numerical scope of 
the men he endeavors to rule. Louis commands the fealty of an imposing number 
of men and their families, and as such we can begin to understand the delicate 
game he is forced to play in order to balance their interests against his own.  
Further, we are shown here that the king himself does not shrink from imposing 
his will (in this case, peace) through threats of violence. These threats, however, 
have less impact on the behavior of the assembled nobles than the king had 
hoped. In the lines immediately following, Guerri the Red assaults Bernier with a 
haunch of venison and a scuffle ensues. When the king asks who started the 
fight, Guerri is identified as the culprit; unashamed and seemingly unafraid of 
losing his head, Guerri responds: 
 
Gueris parole qi fu de grant aïr. 
‘Drois empereres, ne vos en qier mentir, 
trestos li mons vos en devroit haïr, 
qant le poés esgarder ne veïr. 
De vo neveau fiste l’ame departir –  
je me me(r)vel comment le pues soufrir 
qe ne li fais toz les menbres tolir, 
ou pendre as forches ou a honte morir.’ 
Et dist li rois, ‘Nel doit on consentir.  
S’uns gentils hom mande autre por se[r]vir,  
              ne le doit pas vergonder ne honnir (lines 4696-4706) 
 
[Guerri’s spoke with great anger: “Just emperor, I do not wish to lie to 
you.  Everyone should hate you because you are able to keep this man in 
your sight. It amazes me how you can suffer him who from your nephew 
made the soul depart; that you do not take off his limbs or have him 
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hanged from the gallows8 or make him die in dishonor.” The king replied: 
“I cannot agree to this. If one noble man should send for another to serve, 
he should neither dishonor nor shame him…”]  
 
In this passage Guerri the Red’s boldness in his criticisms of the king show a 
marked increase. Whereas he was very much willing to do so privately before, he 
does not shrink now from doing so in the sight of Louis’s thirty thousand 
assembled nobles. Of real interest here is the king’s response to this rather fiery 
accusation: he must respect the service of his vassal, Bernier, and neither 
dishonor him, nor shame him. This is most striking when one considers that 
Louis seems to have no trouble shaming and dishonoring others. He fails to 
follow through on his threat to have whoever breaks the peace at this gathering 
decapitated (Guerri gets to keep his head) and agrees to a judicial duel between 
Bernier and Gautier to settle the matter of the legality of Raoul’s killing.  From 
the gathering at the palace onward, it is increasingly difficult to tell whether the 
king is an apt ruler playing a delicate game of politics, or whether he is simply 
grasping at straws to keep his rule intact.   
 
Nostre empereres le fist comme senez: 
en deus batiaus les fist Saine passer. 
Gautiers est outre, li gentils et li ber, 
il et Berniers, qi tant fait a loer. (lines 4762-4765) 
 
[Our emperor acted like a wise man: he had them cross the Seine in two 
boats. The noble and imposing Gautier was on the other side. He and 
Bernier, who drew such praise.]  
 
This is one of the few passages, again belonging to the R1-Gautier section, which 
characterizes the king’s actions as wise [senez]. Granted, though the wise act in 
question here is to keep Bernier and Gautier separate prior to their judicial duel, 
it is a demonstration of the poet’s belief that Louis is capable of at least some 
reasonable behavior.  
                                                            
8 According to The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, the fourches, or forks were pillars that supported 
a beam from which criminals (in particular, traitors and rebels) were hung. I have selected gallows 
both because it is more common in English usage, but also for its sound.  
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Et dist li rois, ‘Par le cors saint Richier, 
desevrés les, nes la[i]ssiés plus touchier!’ 
[…] 
Qi longement les laissast chaploier,  
el qe’[l] qe soit n’eüst nul recovrier; 
plaies ont grant, ne fine[n]t de saignie[r]. (lines 4935-4944) 
 
[And the king said: “By the body of Saint Riquier9 separate those two, 
don’t let them touch each other anymore!” … If they (Bernier and Gautier) 
had been allowed to continue in the same way neither would have 
recovered; their wounds were great, and did not cease to bleed.]  
 
Here again, Louis demonstrates some coolness of temper in demanding that the 
injured knights be stopped from killing each other outright. The two men are not 
engaged in a battle of finesse, but are rather whacking away at each other 
[chaploier] in a bid to see who can endure the punishment longer. If one takes a 
more cynical view of the king’s motivations, this could be seen as a reaction to 
the incredible violence possible on all sides should the two young men die.  All 
the worse for Louis if they should die during a judicial duel presided over by the 
very king whose actions are increasingly distasteful to his vassals. Ultimately, it is 
not that the king has a generalized distaste for violence, but rather that he fears a 
further loss of order. There are moments in the text, as seen above in his neglect 
to punish Guerri the Red for hitting Bernier, where the king’s actions are used to 
the advantage of the more rebellious barons. A lack of action is taken for 
cowardice, and nothing draws together feuding barons quite like the perception 
that the king is not an effective ruler. As seen in the lines below, Guerri the Red 
uses this perceived cowardice as a means to unify the barons against Louis.  
 
Cest coart roi doit on bien essillier 
car ceste guere nos fist il commencier, 
et mon neveu ocire et detranchier.’ (lines 5244-5246) 
 
[We must banish this cowardly king, for it was him who provoked us to 
war, and on his account that my nephew was killed and decapitated.]  
 
                                                            
9 St. Richarius founded the Abbey of St. Riquier in Picardy in 625. See: Oxford Encyclopedia of the 
Middle Ages. 
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Guerri the Red has shown little reticence with regard to speaking his mind in the 
prior 5000 lines. This call to rally against the king is an outright act of treason. 
Interestingly, he does not call for the king to be killed, rather essilier [exile] which 
I have taken to mean limit, or remove from power. Further, he does not say that 
Louis started the war directly, but nos fist il commencier [he made us start]. The 
obligatory nature of this action is significant, as it is at once an admission of some 
measure of agency on the part of the barons and an assignation of blame to the 
king. I wonder, given the characterization of the king as coart [coward] if this 
might be a way of suggesting that the barons are being used as pawns in a game 
played by the king; that they are being kept busy at war for a purpose yet 
unknown. It is, after all, some of the most powerful families that have been pitted 
against one another.  
 In this following passage, there is an attempt to reason with the king that 
is met with anger and insults. Gautier here tries to appeal to Louis’s sense of 
familial duty, to no avail:  
 
‘Drois empereres,’ dist il, ‘grant tort aveis. 
Je sui vos nié, faillir ne me deveiz.’ 
Et dist li rois, ‘Fel gloz, lai moi ester; 
qe par celio qi en crois fu penez,  
chascuns en iert en fin deseritez!’ (lines 5257-5261) 
 
[“Just emperor,” he said, “you are greatly wrong. I am your nephew, and 
you shouldn’t fail me.” And the king said, “Leave me be, vile rascal. By him 
who suffered on the cross each of you will end up stripped of your 
inheritance!]  
 
It is in these few lines leading up to the suggested shift between the R1 and R2 
poets that we begin to get a picture of the king to come. No longer simply 
politicking or playing a delicate game to keep the most powerful nobles in check, 
he is now beginning to show the tyrannical side that will be the hallmark of the 
R2 poet’s Bernier narrative. While his anger is displaced to his own nephew, 
Louis is in part reacting to Ybert of Ribemont’s desire to cede his lands to his 
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illegitimate but worthy son, Bernier. He begins to lash out, have fits of temper, 
and behave in ways that are no longer in the best interest of his kingdom as a 
whole.   
“Poigniés apres, por Dieu!” dist Loeys; 
et il si font, les ecus au col mis, 
devant les autres li Manciax Giboins 
qi tient la tere R[aoul] de Cambrisis 
et de la guere commensaille fist. (lines 5737-5741) 
 
[“For God’s sake, go after him!” said Louis; and they do, their shields 
raised. In front of all the others is this Manceau Giboin who holds Raoul’s 
lands in the Cambrésis, on whose account this war was begun.]  
 
In this passage, as Giboin from Le Mans rides out in front of the group, Louis 
calls for the capture of Bernier. Not only does the narrator describe, as before, 
this Giboin from Le Mans with a cold reference to his provenance, Manciax, but 
he also shifts the blame for the conflict onto Giboin, whose land-grab started the 
war [de la guere comensaille fist]. Curiously, it is perhaps the poet’s own northern 
provenance being brought to bear here. Le Mans is south and west of Paris, 
whereas Arras, Cambrai, Douai, and other named places are all in the north. Does 
this also belie a great distaste at northern lands being given to someone who is 
not, “one of us”? Furthermore, in asking his vassals to run Bernier down, Louis 
seems to have forgotten that following Giboin’s request to be rewarded for his 
service, it was the king himself who transferred the care of the Cambrésis (here 
Raoul’s by right) to the Manciax. As is often the case with kings, one must be 
careful to stay on the right side of things, which in the case of Louis is 
increasingly impossible. As his barons turn against him, he begins to shift his own 
position more and more aggressively, no doubt in the hopes of retaining his 
crown. This desire to retain his crown is played out most notably in the 
remaining Bernier section of Ms A through a continued dispute over inheritance 
rights and a burgeoning dispute over marriage rights. In laisse 262, Bernier 
avenges Raoul’s death by killing Giboin du Mans, thereby vindicating himself in 
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the eyes of Guerri the Red. In order to unify the barons and repair the damage 
done by the warring families Guerri’s daughter Béatrice is wed to Bernier. This 
sends the king into a fit of rage; he was not consulted, and as seen in the 
following lines, he had other plans for the girl:   
 
Signor, dist il, entendés anvers mi – 
je vos dirai conme Ybers m’a baillit. 
Il tint l’onor de moi de Sain Quentin ; 
Sans mon congiet l’a donee a son fil. 
Doit dont bastars nulle honor maintenir? 
[…] 
Et ceste dame est fille au sor G[uerri] ;s 
Doner la vue[l] a un de mes norris. 
Par cele foit que je dois saint Denis, 
n’a arcevesque an trestot mon païs 
ne nul evesque ne abbet beneït 
se il me vuelt desfendre et contredir 
que ne lie face tos les menbres tolir.” (lines 6263-6276) 
 
[He said, “My lords, listen to me – I will tell you how Ybert has mistreated 
me. By my will he holds Saint Quentin, and without my consent he has 
given it to his son. Should a bastard such as he be allowed to hold lands? … 
And this young woman is the daughter of Guerri the Red; I wanted to give 
her to one of my wards.  By the faith I owe Saint Denis, if there is an 
archbishop, a bishop, or a consecrated abbot in this whole country of 
mine who dares to contradict or disobey me, I will dismember him.”]  
 
Despite having myriad other conflicts in need of resolution, Louis continues to 
take issue with Ybert of Ribemont’s desire to cede his lands to his illegitimate 
son, Bernier. While I suspect this is tangentially related to Bernier’s involvement 
in Raoul’s death, it is most likely tied to what Louis sees as a transgression against 
his kingly right, namely the requirement of his consent for any transfers of land 
or noble marriages. For, not only has Ybert tried to give his lands to the bastard 
whose hand killed Raoul, but this same bastard has married Guerri the Red’s 
daughter, Béatrice, without the king’s consent. This marriage creates a powerful 
alliance between the rightful owners of the Cambrésis, and those surrounding 
Ribemont. Rather than allowing this marriage to bring about the cessation of 
hostilities, Louis ups the stakes: he had planned to give Béatrice to one of his 
wards [norris], Herchambaut. In marrying Bernier to Béatrice, which seems to be 
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a love match, Guerri and Ybert have essentially spoiled any attempt Louis could 
make to consolidate power against them, or to keep the two families locked in 
endless conflict. Further, any heirs whom this union might produce would be 
powerful nobles in their own right. Louis’s response to this is to lash out at the 
very religious institutions that would sanctify such a union by threatening them 
with grisly violence [lie face tos les menbres tolir].    
 As I have shown, although Louis is rarely depicted in a light that is 
entirely positive, there is a slight shift in the way his behavior is seen as the 
narrative progresses from the point of view of the poets, as well as the primary 
“heroes” (if they can be named as such). While R1 and R2 show a king who 
struggles to leverage his power against the considerable might of his barons, the 
R1 poet’s Louis seems much more motivated by politics, whereas the R2 poet’s 
Louis is much more susceptible to slights against his person. The bulk of my 
work in the paper that follows will be to discern to what degree these shifts in the 
portrayal of powerful men are tied to the shifting attitudes towards lordship and 
power in the century that saw the production of Raoul de Cambrai’s most 
complete manuscript.  
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Rules for Rulers: John of Salisbury’s Policraticus  
 
Very little is known about the early life and family of John of Salisbury. 
He is believed to have been born between 1115 and 1120, at Old Sarum10, and it is 
very likely that he began his education there before moving his studies first to 
Exeter, and then to Paris to begin his advanced studies in 1136. In Paris, John 
studied under Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers (among others) before 
eventually completing the trivium, quadrivium, and higher philosophical studies 
around 1141 (Nederman, John 2-8). John’s later style was perhaps most marked by 
Abelard’s instruction, “he tells us that he regarded Abelard as the greatest 
logician of his age, and drank in every word from his lips…” (Wilks, 267). 
Following several years as a teacher in his own right, John entered the clergy in 
the service of Abbot Peter of Celle. He was then introduced to Theobald, 
Archbishop of Canterbury in whose service he remained for the bulk of his career 
(Nederman, John 11-15).  
It was during his time as Theobald’s secretary that John met Thomas 
Becket, whose conflict with Henry II would greatly mark John’s life and career. 
While Christopher Brooke asserts that the two were close personal friends, 
others are less enthusiastic about their relationship (16). Although the two men 
were colleagues, and John dedicated his two major works to Becket, Cary 
Nederman rejects the notion that this proximity necessarily meant that the two 
were friends (15-16). It is also during this period that John was first excluded from 
Henry’s court, following accusations that he had been using his time at the curia 
of Pope Adrian IV to push the interests of Canterbury over those of the king 
(Nederman, John 19-21). After Theobald’s death in 1162, and Thomas Becket’s 
                                                            
10 The Oxford English Dictionary gives the location of Old Sarum as approximately two miles from 
Salisbury. It was abandoned in 1220, with the establishment of the new cathedral and surrounding 
town nearer to the Avon, at Salisbury. As such, John was very nearly from Salisbury, though not 
quite.  
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consecration as the new Archbishop of Canterbury, John stayed on as part of the 
curia, though his role was rather changed – according to Nederman:  
Because John had cultivated personal relationships with leading 
ecclesiastical (and also secular) figures throughout Europe, his ‘public 
relations’ value in diplomatic matters was far greater than any other 
contribution he might make… It might also be speculated that Becket did 
not feel comfortable keeping in his immediate circle an individual who 
had been publicly critical in letters and writings of his own errant ways 
while chancellor.” (John 28-29) 
For reasons that remain unclear, John left for France a year into Becket’s 
tenure, where he began to see the archbishop’s conflict with Henry not as a mere 
personal dispute, but as a question of the oppression of the Church by the crown. 
At some point, John returned to Becket’s curia and he was present at his 
martyrdom (as he saw it) in December of 1170 – he almost immediately took up 
the cause for Becket’s sainthood, distributing an account of the murder. 
Although the progress of such a dedicated champion for Becket cannot have 
pleased King Henry, John’s rise to Treasurer of Exeter in 1173 was unimpeded by 
the monarch. John’s success in this position was rewarded by his consecration as 
bishop of Chartres in 1176.  According to Nederman, there seems to be some 
contention as to the efficacy of John’s episcopal career as the documents related 
to it are limited to a small number of charters, a couple of critical letters from his 
contemporaries, and a laudatory necrology dated shortly after John’s death in 
October 1180 (John 29-33, 35, 37-39).   
 John of Salisbury is perhaps best known for his two major works of theory, 
the Metalogicon and the Policraticus. For this paper, I will be concentrating on the 
Policraticus, but I would be remiss not to mention the importance of both works 
in furthering the theorization of the liberal arts and politics in their own time and 
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through the ensuing centuries. John’s Policraticus, completed in the autumn of 
1159 (though Nederman contends that he likely continued to edit it as the years 
passed) (John, 53) is subtitled, “de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum” [of the 
frivolities of courtiers and the footprints of philosophers]. This subtitle gives 
better description of the content of the work than its title of Policraticus, which, 
however evocative, is the linguistic invention of the author. John chose to write 
in Latin and his work consists of eight books each containing roughly twenty to 
thirty chapters. As there are few print versions of the Policraticus available in its 
original Latin, I will be using Clement C. J. Webb’s edition. Where possible, I 
will be using Cary Nederman’s translation,11 with the caveat that his version omits 
most of book one, all of book two, and roughly half of the chapters in the 
remaining books. For anything not found by the grace of Nederman, I will be 
providing my own translations. 
 One of the most beguiling aspects of the Policraticus is that it does not fit 
cleanly into any one genre, at least not in the modern sense of the word. It is at 
once a work of political science and theory, of theology, of the history of 
thought, and of moral didacticism. Whilst contributing to the beauty of the text, 
this defiance of category makes it difficult (though not impossible) to determine 
its intended audience with certainty. Modern scholars have tended to classify the 
Policraticus as a work of political theory whereas medieval readers might have seen 
it quite differently. The divisions between different types of knowledge were, as 
evidenced by the trivium and quadrivium that led to mastery of the seven liberal 
arts, much more fluid than they are now. The terms philosophy and science were 
able to interact in ways that have been made impossible now, and John’s readers 
would not have been troubled by what might now be seen as a blending of genre. 
                                                            
11 Whereas it is most convenient in Nederman’s translation to cite page numbers, I will be using 
Webb’s section numbers as they are far more specific, thus rendering it easier for the reader to 
locate any cited passages.  
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It is important to remember that John’s Policraticus appears only a generation 
before Vincent de Beauvais’ Speculum maius, whose inclusion of natural history, 
the liberal and mechanical arts, political, ecclesiastical, and literary history, was 
seen “as one that expressed the intellectual tendencies of its time” (Franklin-
Brown, 96). Given the ease with which medieval readers accepted the inclusion 
and application of varied subjects in works like the Policraticus, it is logical that 
John’s uses politics and historiae as a means of moral and philosophical instruction 
towards a life well lived. For example, Nederman asserts that John identifies a 
path to earthly happiness that can be reached by following in the aforementioned 
“footsteps of the philosophers” through active and reflective means by embracing 
virtue and wisdom. He further asserts that this path is accessible to all humans, 
whether they choose to earn access to it or not (John, 43). Our audience is then 
one that would be concerned with earthly happiness as well as heavenly reward, 
and as such the Policraticus was likely not just destined to the consumption of 
clerics. However, the work is in Latin, which might lead one to believe that it was 
intended only for nobles, clerics, and students of the cathedral schools. However, 
as Emma Campbell explains: 
Though the nature and depth of instruction could vary, clerical education 
focused on Latin and the literature and culture of classical antiquity. The 
association of the cleric with the ability to read Latin was reflected by the 
fact that the Old French term clergie could be used to mean knowledge of 
Latin, as well as referring to the social order associated with such learning. 
… By contrast, a layman was someone who had no such education – which 
is not to say that the laity were illiterate in the modern sense of the term… 
being illiterate can describe a state of being unlearned or illiterate in 
Latin, rather than a total inability to read or write. Laymen of the upper 
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classes in particular may have had a degree of practical literacy and some 
may have read quite fluently. (210-211) 
My own suspicions are that the Policraticus is, among other things, primarily a 
didactic text. For, it is well know that John displayed a lifelong love of rhetoric as 
a means to uncovering the truth of a given situation (Brooke, 6-7), so it stands to 
reason that this was reflected by his work. The backbone of John’s argument is 
based around a system of binaries and oppositions that seek to give examples of 
what is good, just, virtuous, or wise conduct by giving contrasting examples of 
bad, frivolous, or tyrannical conduct. Following in the tradition of his education 
he does this by setting forth a series of historical, semi-historical, and outright 
fabricated characters and situations through a complex series of exempla.12 
Although John could only have known of Cicero’s De legibus and De re publica 
through Christian intermediaries, Nederman argues that he is still a devotee of 
academic dispute in the Ciceronian style (John, 53). It is what Von Moos calls 
“the credibility of tradition” that takes precedence over the authenticity of 
sources (224). In this vein, John himself argues in his prologue to the Policraticus 
that: 
Exempla maiorum, quae sunt incitamenta et fomenta uirtutis, nullum omnino 
erigerent aut seruarent, nisi pia sollicitudo scriptorium et triumphatrix inertiae 
diligentia eadem ad posteros transmisset. (Webb, sec 385 a-b) 
 
[The examples of our ancestors, which are incitements and inducements 
to virtue, never would have encouraged and been heeded by everyone, 
unless, through devotion, care and diligence, writers triumphed over 
idleness and transmitted these things to posterity.] (Nederman, 3) 
 
The above passage indicates that he considers himself to be part of this same 
tradition that, through diligence and learning, transmits knowledge to those who 
                                                            
12 Von Moos and Nederman have both likened this approach to that of Abelard’s Sic et non. It 
should be noted that John’s example of Plutarch’s letter instructing Trajan in chapter one of book 
five and ensuing commentary is his own invention, behind which he hides his own originality 
(Nederman, John, 55). 
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would read his work. In true medieval style he does not take credit for the idea, 
nor for the idea to set it forth ad posteros.  
The patterns of deductive reasoning as well as the use of antithesis are key 
to the structure of the Policraticus. While Nederman asserts that the use of these 
contradictions are a merely sort of didactic exercise in reasoning (John, 55-56), I 
wonder if they might also express an amount of uncertainty on the part of the 
author with regard to the moral ambiguities of the political realms he inhabited. 
Further to this, Nederman describes the Policraticus as confronting the “practical 
demands of politics in relation to the requirements of living well in an ethical and 
religious sense” (John, 62). In the remaining portion of this section, I will examine 
these binaries and contradictions, as well as John’s argumentation, in order to 
assess these uncertainties as a compliment to the already established scholarly 
characterization of the Policraticus as didactic.  
John’s system is non-linear, which, while fairly common to traditional 
dialectic, causes some confusion in the reader who is forced to move back and 
forth through the book in order to follow his argument. I do not doubt, given the 
time and energy expended in the writing of the Policraticus, and especially given 
John’s high level of skill in the fields of grammar and rhetoric (as shown more 
fully in his Metalogicon), that there is a good measure of intent behind its 
structure. However, when dealing with the types of uncertainty of social 
structure and opinion treated in the Policraticus, I wonder if this scattered 
approach wherein the author returns and reconsiders, or outright contradicts key 
elements might signify an inner, as well as an external conflict with regard to 
these same points. This will be most obvious in the passages dealing with the 
rights of kings, and the proper disposal of tyrants that will be the focus of this 
section. It is important to note that John disliked generalizations and as such 
followed a “doctrine of two ways to the truth” that set up oppositions in order to 
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force the learner to distinguish between persuasive and dissuasive examples, 
between the positive and the negative (Wilks, 271 and Von Moos, 219).  
It might be the most productive route to first establish through a series of 
my own exempla how John perceives the duties and proper conduct of princes 
before delving into his treatment of tyrants. The bulk of John’s instructions for 
princeps, which Nederman translates as “the prince” are found in the fourth book 
of the Policraticus. While I agree wholeheartedly with Nederman’s interpretation 
here, it is nonetheless important to draw attention to this translation, for, princeps 
could also mean any leader, of noble birth or not.13 It is also important to note 
that John uses “the prince” and not “the king” as these distinctions will prove 
important once the Policraticus is considered alongside Raoul de Cambrai.  
If we wish to know, generally, how John sees the position and 
comportment of the prince, we need look no further than the chapter headings 
of Book Four. Here, we see that “…princeps, licet sit legis nexibus absolutus, legis tamen 
seruus est et aequitatis, geritque personam publicam, et innocenter sanguinam fundit” 
(Webb, vi) […the prince, although he is an absolutely binding law unto himself, 
still is the servant of law and equity, the bearer of the public persona, and sheds 
blood blamelessly] (Nederman, vi) situates the prince as a public entity whose 
power is absolute, though limited by legis [law] and aequitatis [equity]. There is a 
level of violence implicit in princely power, as bloodshed is not only invoked, but 
also justified. It is an interesting dichotomy to be able to shed blood with 
impunity, yet also be a seruus [servant or slave] to law and equity. This separation 
is perhaps better explained in the second chapter of book four, where John 
states: 
Princeps tamen legis nexibus dicitur absolutus, non quia ei iniqua liceant, sed quia is 
esse debet, qui non timore penae sed amore iustitiae aequitatem colat, rei publicae 
                                                            
13 The Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources supports this. The term princeps, in addition 
to referring to a prince or sovereign ruler, can also be one who is in charge (as leader or chief), the 
ruler of a principality, or one who is preeminent in their field.  
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procuret utilitatem, et in omnibus aliorum commodapriuitate praeferat uoluntati. 
(Webb, 515a) 
 
[Still the prince is said to be an absolutely binding law unto himself, not 
because he is licensed to be iniquitous, but only because he should be 
someone who does not fear the penalties of law but someone who loves 
justice, cherishes equity, procures the utility of the republic, and in all 
matters prefers the advantage of others to his own private will.] 
(Nederman, 30) 
 
In this case the prince is not limited in any practical way by penae iustitiae 
[penalties of law], but rather by his love of justice and his respect for the proper 
functioning of the system. Therefore, though the prince is perhaps not 
punishable by any earthly law, he is still morally beholden to justice. This moral 
aspect of the prince is especially interesting when the following passage, taken 
from chapter one of book four and thereby preceding it by mere paragraphs, is 
taken into account:    
Est ergo, ut eum plerique diffiniunt, princeps potestas publica et in terris quaedam 
diuinae maiestatis imago. Proculdubio magnum quid diuinae uirtutis declaratur 
inesse principibus, dum homines nutibus eorum colla submittunt et securi plerumque 
feriendas praebent ceruices, et impulsu diuino quisque timet quibus ipse timori est. 
(Webb, 513d-514a) 
 
[Therefore, according to the general definition, the prince is the public 
power and a certain image on earth of the divine majesty. Beyond doubt 
the greatest part of the divine virtue is revealed to belong to the prince, in 
so far as at his nod men bow their heads and generally offer their necks to 
the axe in sacrifice, and by divine impulse everyone fears him who is fear 
itself.] (Nederman, 28) 
 
Here, the violence implicit in the prince’s power is shown again. John suggests 
that a balance of fear and love drives the prince’s power in that his subjects prove 
their love through willingness to self-sacrifice, but are inherently fearful of him. 
Although a prince who loves justice yet rules by fear seems like a logical fallacy, 
John explains that this is possible due to the ruler being an image of the divine on 
earth. If the medieval reader accepts that God can rule both through love and 
through the imposition of fear, then they must also accept this in the office of 
the prince. John continues in this direction through the passage below.   
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Diligens namque lector legis discipulus est, non magister; nec ad sensun suum 
captiutam retorquet legum, sed menti eius et integritati sensus suos accomodat… 
Vitque timere Dominum Deum suum. Recte quidem, eo qoud sapientia parit et 
firmat principatum; atqui initium sapientiae timor Domini. (Webb, 526c-d) 
 
[For in fact a diligent reader is a disciple of the law, not a master; nor does 
he distort the law as a captive to his own discretion, but he accommodates 
his discretion to its meaning and integrity… He surely learns to fear the 
Lord his God. Properly so because wisdom begets and fortifies 
government; and fearing the Lord stimulates wisdom.] (Nederman, 46-47)  
 
The prince is, therefore, not a law unto himself, but a disciple of the law, or both, 
if such a thing is possible. The prince should desire the knowledge and wisdom to 
rule well, but ultimately the power belongs to God. In fact, John had long 
struggled with the dual authority of the church and the king, as well as their 
shared spaces of power (Brooke, 17). It stands to reason then, John being a man 
of the church, that he would place God at the summit of both earthly and 
heavenly power. Also worth noting is John’s insistence on the traits of the ideal 
prince as a reader (lector) endowed with wisdom (sapientia). That is, that he should 
be educated and concerned with the increase of wisdom as a means to rule well. 
It is the thought that good rule stems from the head and the heart, and not from 
brute strength, that becomes one of the hallmarks of John’s argument. Although 
much time is spent in explaining his ideal of the moral might, John, whether by 
habit or indecision, includes ample opportunity for the God-fearing good king to 
exact violence upon his people if necessary: 
Sic et enim fratres diligit, quod errores eorum medicinaliter corrigit; sic in eis 
carnem agnoscit  et sanguinem, ut ea spiritus subiciat ditioni… sic et potestas cum 
inferiorum uitia mansueta manu curare non sufficit, penarum acrimoniam dolens 
recte uulneribus infundit, et pia crudelitate seuit in malos, dum bonorum 
incolumitas procurator. (Webb, 529a-b) 
 
[And thus, for him to love his brothers, he must correct their errors in 
medical fashion; he must acknowledge the flesh and blood in them so that 
he may subject them to the words of the Spirit… And thus when mild 
power does not suffice for the ruler to cure the vices of inferiors, he 
properly administers intensely painful blows of punishment; pious cruelty 
rages against the evil, while the good are looked after in safety.] 
(Nederman, 49-50)  
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This passage from chapter eight, echoed again in chapter ten, is particularly 
violent in its language, as well as in its message. It is interesting to consider here 
the necessary dichotomies between the enacting of love for a brother through 
punishment of the flesh, as well as that of the infliction of pain (no matter the 
piety of the prince) by one said to love justice and wisdom over all else. I do not 
wish here to apply modern morality to a period whose concepts of justice might 
be said to vary from our own, but instead to draw attention to John’s own 
seeming indecision surrounding the behavior of princes.  
Furthermore, I admit to being somewhat baffled by the inclusion of the 
term medicaliter, which Nederman translates here as “in medical fashion”.14  The 
term is most likely a variant of medicabiliter [in a healing manner] or medicinaliter 
[as a medicine, by way of a cure]. John goes on to justify, if not explain his use of 
this rather anomalous term in the following lines, where it becomes clear that he 
means not that there should be anything inherently medical or medicinal about 
the correction itself, but rather that the prince should increase the dosage of the 
correction to suit the magnitude of the error as, “medicorum consuetudo est” (Webb, 
529a) [is the habit of physicians] (Nederman, 50). His justice should be curative. 
The ruler is seen in this case to behave as the healer of the sickness of poor 
conduct, in order to keep the body politic in good order (Struve, 311).  In essence, 
John argues that the punishment should fit the crime, although he does not seem 
concerned with modern notions of leniency, arguing instead that the prince is 
right in imposing punishments that are adequately severe.   
Gloriatur Dominus se uirum inuenisse secundum cor suum et, cum eum in regni 
apicem postmodum sullimasset, succedentium sibi filiorum curriculo regnum ei 
perpetuum pollicetur. (Webb, 533c) 
   
[The Lord will pride Himself that He has encountered a man after His 
own heart, and when He has lifted him up rapidly to the apex within the 
                                                            
14 Medicaliter does not appear in the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources, the Du 
Cange, or Lewis and Short. The definitions that follow are from the DMLBS.  
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kingdom, He will offer the kingdom to him perpetually through the 
succession of the line of his sons.] (Nederman, 56) 
  
Chapter eleven is especially concerned with lines of succession, and how God 
intervenes to select these lines. It is interesting to note that in the ideal prince 
the Lord will find a heart that follows his own, whether this is the benevolent 
heart of the New Testament or the wrathful heart of the Old Testament is 
unclear. As I progress into John’s treatment of tyrants in book eight of the 
Policraticus, it will be key to these systems of contradictions to bear the divinity of 
the prince in mind. 
 As discussed earlier, the concept of the divine right of kings is not 
entirely solidified in this period; yet what John describes here is indicative of 
some kind of belief that the divine intervenes in the selection of kings. 
Furthermore, if God appoints the ideal prince, then what is to be said of any 
problematic, or tyrannical issue he might have, given that his line has been 
preordained for rule from the outset? The answer is never given outright, but 
there will be some elucidation of John’s views in the following passages. Indeed, 
while it begins with advice on proper attire and the more benign vices, much of 
book eight is devoted to differentiating princes from tyrants, and the proper 
response to tyrannical behavior.15  
Est ergo tirannus, ut eum philosophi depixerunt, qui uiolenta domination populum 
permit, sicut qui legibus regit princeps est… Princeps pugnat pro legibus et populi 
libertate; tirannus nil actum putat nisi leges euacuet et populum deuocet in 
seruitutem. (Webb, 777d) 
 
[As the philosophers have portrayed him, the tyrant is, therefore one who 
oppresses the people by violent domination, just as the prince is one who 
rules by the laws… The prince fights for the laws and liberty of the people; 
the tyrant supposes that nothing is done unless the laws are cancelled and 
the people are brought into servitude.] (Nederman, 191)  
 
                                                            
15 John has many opinions with regard to singing, dancing, and hunting, all of which can be found 
in the prologue and early chapters of Policraticus. Other topics discussed are avarice and excessive 
frugality. 
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Once again, a definition through the eyes of the philosophers is given. One could 
see this as a sort of general approach to the subject in the vein of exempla and 
deference to tradition as seen in the preceding passages. However, it has been 
suggested by certain scholars that John is attempting to correct what he views as 
tyrannical behavior on the part of Henry II.16 This should, therefore, while in line 
with what other contemporary philosophers have said, be read also as a warning 
in direct address. The nature of this address might help to explain why much of 
what John has to say about tyrants has been characterized as, “molten down into 
curious amalgams and strange emollients” (Van Laarhoven, 322). John may well 
have felt conflicted with regard to his duty to king, and his duty to God and 
church, especially when faced by what he saw as tyrannical behavior from both 
church and state. Certainly, given Henry’s reputation as, “a man of intense, 
mercurial temperament who could shift in a moment from sunshine to thunder” 
(Brooke, 17) it would have been prudent for John to speak theoretically rather 
than risk the ire of his ruler, even if everyone knew implicitly who was being 
addressed. Furthermore, the insistence on law is again important, as John would 
have seen law as “regula recte vivendi, a rule of right living [that] cannot therefore, 
he argues, be divorced from God. It is a donum Dei, a divine gift” (Wilks, 270). To 
be a tyrant is to flout the authority given by God, as well as his gifts in the form 
of law and order. Van Laarhoven takes this even further, identifying John’s stance 
on tyranny not purely as a political problem, but more importantly as an 
ideological, “résumé of inhuman, unnatural pride, of moral injustice, and of 
theological iniquity. It [tyranny] is in fact the diabolical counterpart of God’s 
intentions for man and society. For it is in the end the devil, that enemy from the 
beginning, who is acting through human behavior… but God will win” (331). This 
                                                            
16 Michael Wilks stops short of saying this is explicitly about Henry, but the implication is quite 
clear (282). Cary Nederman also, in conversation, implied that much of Policraticus, and these 
sections on tyrants were addressed to him. 
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is the crux of the issue: In saying that, “tirannus nil actum putat nisi leges euacuet” 
[the tyrant supposes that nothing is done unless the laws are cancelled], John is 
saying that the tyrant actively engages himself against God. This act of 
opposition will support John’s later claims that it is just and lawful to kill tyrants. 
It bears mentioning that Van Laarhoven does not see this as an actual call to 
tyrannicide, as much as a warning to tyrants of the extent to which God can and 
will punish them (329).  
 There remains the small problem of contradictions as John lays out 
princely behavior in the earlier books of his Policraticus. Specifically, that a good 
prince is allowed a measure of violence against his subjects as a means of 
correction and that the prince is a law unto himself. There seems to be a certain 
amount of crossover between what a prince does and what a tyrant does with 
little allowance made for anything but intent. A prince can be violent and 
oppressive as long as he defers to God, whereas a tyrant counts himself as 
ultimately outside of heavenly jurisdiction. John doesn’t allow this dichotomy to 
go entirely unaddressed, in acknowledging the following: “Itaque et tiranni nomine 
rex et e conuerso interdum principis nomine tirannis appelatur…” (Webb, 779b) [And so 
the king is sometimes called by the name of tyrant and conversely the tyrant is 
sometimes called by the name of prince…] (Nederman, 193). That is, tyranny can 
be a matter of perception, rather than an inherent vice. A good king can become 
tyrannical, and a bad king occasionally takes on princely features. Furthermore, 
the tyrant is often a potentially good king whose rule has somehow been 
perverted by ego, flattery, or neglect for education. As Wilks explains, “Kings 
become tyrants when they not only listen to flatterers, but believe what they are 
told: the flatterer tells the prince that he is other than he ought to be and really 
is. By creating the fiction of the absolute ruler, the prince literally does not know 
himself” (281). The remedy for this is, of course, a prince who knows his place as 
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subservient to God and who rules using a blend of faith and reason and a prince 
who values wisdom above the execution of absolute power (Wilks, 285). It is also 
important to note that whereas later notions of divine right would eliminate the 
common will from the equation of a monarch’s rule, at the time John was writing 
there was still very much the belief that the king ruled not only by God’s will, but 
also by the consent of the people (Kern, 12).17  
 The confusion does not end there. Perhaps most baffling in the series of 
ruminations on tyranny are the passages in which John seeks to justify their 
ostensibly bad behavior:  
Ministros Dei tamen tirannos esse non abnego, qui in utroque primatu, scilicet 
animarum et corpum, iusto suo iudicio esse uoluit per quos punirentur mali et 
corrigerentur et exercerentur boni… Ergo et tiranni potestas bona quidem est, 
tirannide tamen nichil est peius. Est enim tirannis a Deo concessae potestatis abusus. 
In hoc tamen malo multus et magnus est bonorum usus. (Webb, 786a) 
  
[Yet I do not deny that tyrants are ministers of God, who by His just 
judgment has willed them to be pre-eminent over both soul and body. By 
means of tyrants, the evil are punished and the good are corrected and 
trained... Therefore, even the power of tyrants is in a certain sense good, 
yet nothing is worse than tyranny. For tyranny is an abuse of the power 
conceded to man by God. Yet this evil is used for many and great goods.] 
(Nederman, 201-202)  
 
It might seem odd to some that a tyrant could ever be called a minister of God, 
especially as Van Laarhoven has established that tyrants are the precise opposite 
of God’s intentions for earthly society. However, John is acting here within a 
long tradition going back to scripture. As St. Paul writes in his epistle to the 
Romans:  
...princes are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil. Wilt thou then  
not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good: and thou shalt have 
praise from the same. For he is God's minister to thee, for good. But if 
thou do that which is evil, fear: for he beareth not the sword in vain. For 
                                                            
17 I do not of course mean “the people” in the later Marxist incarnations of the term, but rather 
the upper echelons of society including the nobility, the clergy, and the merchant classes who 
found themselves in a position to consent to rule.  
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he is God's minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. 
(13:3-4) 
Similarly, St. Augustine describes the career of Julius Caesar as being divinely 
inspired, even if the emperor had certain tyrannical qualities. It is, as Augustine 
explains, unimportant that that Caesar did not believe in the Christian God, 
because God worked through him regardless. He goes on to explain that no 
existence is contrary to God because sin is an act of will and not an act inherent 
to one’s nature. This is seen even in the angels, who whether good or bad have 
the same nature – like the good king and the tyrant, it is only their acts that 
separate them (196-205, 448-449, 471-473). Therefore, it stands to reason that 
John calls tyrants ministers of God, for, even though their acts are contrary to his 
will, they are nonetheless occupying a divine position. 
 Beyond this tradition, John seems to find some good in the fact that 
tyrants will mete out punishment to evil men, even if there might be some 
collateral damage. John may also be referring to the “bad priests and greedy 
prelates” (Van Laarhoven, 323), very literally ministers of God, with whom he 
often came into contact. Perhaps the most important thing here is that, once 
again, rulers are given power as a result of divine will, even if they are bad. There 
is also the possibility that John was acutely aware of the ceremonial ties between 
king and church that manifested through the similarities in the consecration of 
monarchs and the consecration of priests. Through the coronation rite of 
anointing, the king became a sort of rex sacerdos, or ruler-priest, holy in office if 
not in person (Bertelli, 13-14). As previously seen, the office of the monarch, 
validated by the leaders of the church, takes on its own sacral quality. This 
validation by the church makes the king a minister of God and, be he good or be 
he a tyrant, the tie to the divine cannot be unmade. John’s assertion that tyrants 
are the ministers of God is then fully in line with common belief of the era, if still 
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not somewhat contradictory in its execution that God uses tyrants to do good 
works.       
 The most revolutionary thing that John does in his Policraticus, though he 
would have likely hated the term, is the justification and encouragement of 
tyrannicide in his own era. Many philosophers throughout the ages have 
condoned the killing of tyrants, often using Caesar as an allegory, but few (if any) 
would have dared to theorize regicide such an open way, using contemporary 
examples.   
  John begins his ruminations on tyrannicide with examples from antiquity, 
using Nero and Caligula to support his argument before citing a well-known story 
from the apocryphal book of Judith to underline his assertions that, “licitum et 
gloriosum est publicos tirannos occidere” (Webb, 793b) […it is lawful and glorious to 
kill public tyrants] (Nederman, 206) and, “Ut autem et ab alia constet historia iustum 
esse publicos occidi tirannos et populum ad Dei obsequium liberari” (Webb, 795a) [It is 
also accepted by another history that it is just for public tyrants to be killed and 
the people to be liberated for obedience to God] (Nederman, 207). John was 
particularly well equipped to give biblical commentary, and as such, the examples 
he selected for his Policraticus should be regarded as very much intentional. There 
is no accident in his choice to use the story of Judith and Holofernes despite 
myriad other possible examples of tyrants. Indeed, “all the kings of Israel and 
most of the kings of Judah were tyrants” (Saltman, 343-345). The story of Judith is 
of particular interest for two reasons: first, she is a woman whose personal honor 
is beyond reproach, and second, she gains access to Holofernes (with God’s help) 
using what John calls pia simulatione (Webb, 795b) [a pious deception] (Nederman, 
207).  
 In the earlier chapters of the Policraticus, John is not keen on deceit. 
Therefore, it is interesting to consider the contradictory nature of allowing 
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deception in the case of tyrants. The moral ambiguities surrounding tyrannicide 
are palpable, though John explains, “Non quod tirannos de medio tollendos esse non 
credam sed sine religionis honestatisque dispendio” (Webb, 796c) [Not that I do not 
believe that tyrants are to be removed from the community, but they are to be 
removed without loss to religion and honour] (Nederman, 209). In the case of 
Judith and Holofernes, this statement will provide the justification for her 
deceitful behavior as well as for the killing of Nebuchadnezzar’s fiercest general. 
The story of Judith is not a simple story of deception; rather, in her case, deceit is 
a holy tool bestowed upon a human vessel. John’s views on the matter are 
nuanced. He does not like falsehoods, but, as we will see, deception in favor of 
the Lord supersedes mortal deception. As well as being a good biblical example of 
tyrannicide, the story of Judith is entertaining. John’s decision to use it was 
perhaps as much driven by his love of anecdote as by anything else.  
Holofernes had been sent to lay waste to any kingdom whose people 
would not submit to Assyrian rule, Israel and Judah among them. The people of 
Israel, fearing for their lives, prayed for divine intervention to no avail. Then, as 
Holofernes’ armies were camped outside the city of Bethulia, a widow named 
Judith decided to take action (Judith 2:2-6, 4:7-16, 8-9). John’s description of 
Judith’s preparations to meet Holofernes mirror very closely the entries in the 
vulgate bible, in saying: 
...abstulit a se cilicium et exuit se uestibus uiduitatis, et lauit corpus suum, et unxit se 
mirra optima, et descriminauit crinem capitis sui, et imposit mitram super caput 
suum, et induit se uestibus iocunditatis suae... Contulitque ei splendorem Dominus, 
quoniam omnis ista compositio non ex libidine sed ex uirtute pendebat. Et ideo 
Dominus hanc in illa pulchritudinem ampliauit ut icnomparabili decore oculis 
omnium appareret. (Webb, 795c-d)   
 
[...she removed her hair shirt from herself and she stripped off the 
garments of her widowhood, and she bathed her body, and anointed 
herself with the best myrrh, and arranged the hair on her head, and placed 
a headband on her head, and put on her most pleasing garments... And the 
Lord conferred splendour upon her since all these arrangements were 
determined not by lust but by virtue. And so the Lord increased her 
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beauty in order that she might appear incomparably elegant to everyone’s 
eyes.] (Nederman, 208) 
 
Holofernes was so impressed by Judith’s beauty that he led her into his 
bedchamber with evil intent. Not one to be perverted by the wickedness of 
others, Judith waited for him to drink himself to sleep, at which point she picked 
up the general’s own sword and cut off his head. With the help of her 
maidservant, Judith carried the head of Holofernes back to Bethulia. The loss of 
their general, and the public displaying of his head caused the Assyrian armies to 
abandon their cause and the Israelites were saved (Judith, 13, 15).  
Returning to John’s assertion above, Judith seems a perfect example of the 
removal of a tyrant without loss to religion or honor. True, she achieves her goal 
by carrying out a fairly large-scale deception; she takes off her widow’s clothing, 
she styles her hair, she puts on perfume, and she does so with the help of the 
Lord. Her deception is thus sanctioned by God that she might act in service to 
her people. Whereas John might have otherwise condemned this type of action, 
here he whole-heartedly condones it: “Non est enim dolus qui seruit fidei et militat 
caritati. Siquidem fidei est quod increpat sacerdotes...” (Webb, 795b) [For that which 
maintains the faith and serves charity is not deceitful. And it is indeed through 
faith that she (Judith) reproved the priests...] (Nederman, 207). If this seems a bit 
convenient given John’s somewhat contradictory nature, he goes on to explain: 
“Dei obsequium liberari, ipsi quoque sacerdotes Domini necem eorum reputant pietatem et, 
si quid doli uidetur habere imaginem, religione misterii dicunt” (Webb, 795a-b) [Priests 
of the Lord themselves count their (tyrants) slaying as an act of piety and, if 
anything appears to contain an element of deceit, they call it a mystery of religion 
consecrated to the Lord] (Nederman, 207).    
While John uses examples from antiquity and scripture to support his 
claims, he does not frame his argument solely around these historiae. His 
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reasoning regarding the ancient tyrants seems clear enough, though it is in the 
contemporary examples that the conflicted nature of John’s argumentative 
strategy is most apparent. It is glorious to kill a tyrant, but ultimately John’s 
reasoning makes carrying out the act morally difficult in his own time. For 
example, he says, “Hoc tamen cauendum docent historiae, ne quis illius moliatur 
interitum cui fidei aut sacrementi religionem tenetur astrictus" (Webb, 796b) [The 
histories teach us that we are to take care, however, lest anyone cause the death 
of a tyrant who is bound to him by the obligation of fealty or a sacred oath] 
(Nederman, 209). Judith was bound by oath neither to Holofernes, nor to 
Nebuchadnezzar, so by John’s reasoning her act was just. His contemporary 
examples, in contrast, are greatly troubled by this interdiction against tyrannicide 
implied by oaths of fealty. For, as John implies, an oath (including an oath of 
fealty) is a promise before God and promises made before God cannot and 
should not be broken. As such, even an oath made to a tyrant is a binding moral 
contract between the swearer and God that cannot be undone, no matter how 
abhorrent the tyrant. This does not mean that tyrants are necessarily suffered to 
live by the divine. On the contrary, God’s own intervention gives those would-be 
killers of tyrants an escape clause, provided they act using the same sorts of 
divine tools offered to Judith.  
In chapter twenty-one of book eight John gives a series of exempla from 
nostris temporibus [our own times] wherein he lists various means by which God 
punishes tyrants. While Van Laarhoven asserts that these examples serve merely 
as a warning for tyrants in the sense that, “this is not an invitation to take 
tyrannicide in hand; it is a very serious warning to take tyranny off one’s hands” 
(328), I would disagree. It is clear that John is advocating that some kind of action 
be taken against tyrants and not that they should heed his warning and simply 
correct themselves. What is clear, is that John is not comfortable with this action 
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being taken by man’s will alone, preferring instead to provide examples of 
martyrs, or persons moved by God to take action by his own will; thus God, as 
with Judith, acts through man in order to carry out a sacred duty. Scholars like 
Van Laarhoven and Von Moos paint John’s approach to tyrannicide as a didactic 
exercise, I am not entirely convinced. Surely, a purely theoretical exercise would 
be more cleanly executed, and would present a clear argument for or against; 
John’s manages neither.  
The best example of this is found in John’s description of the tyrannicide 
by martyrdom of Eustace, heir apparent to king Stephen of England18: “die 
antequam se domi suae reciperet, quae nimis uicina erat, tactus est martiris manu et letali 
percussus morbo die circiter octaua rebus cessit et uita” (Webb, 807a)  [on the day before 
he was to retire to his home nearby, he was touched by the hand of the martyr 
and, struck down with a fatal illness, his life and affairs ceased on about the 
eighth day] (Nederman, 213). Here God has acted through an unnamed martyr, 
but credit is ultimately given to human hands for transmitting the sickness that 
killed Eustace. 
  While these are both perfect examples of what Von Moos calls “the 
double edged sword” of John’s exempla, Von Moos explains that they are chosen 
intentionally, either to support or refute an argument as a means to training the 
reader in philosophical reflection (225, 227-228). I would argue, instead, that such 
examples are proof of John’s unease in negotiating his own beliefs about regicide. 
John was trained by some of the best rhetoricians and logicians of his age, 
Abelard among them, and was thus highly skilled at argumentation. There seems 
to me to be then, a yet unanswered question: how does one excel at grammar and 
rhetoric, and yet present such consistently inconsistent and scattered arguments? 
                                                            
18 John here uses a contemporary example. Eustace IV, Count of Boulogne was, by all accounts, 
the bad son of a bad king. He died a year before his father in 1153, allowing Henry II to succeed to 
the throne. See: The Oxford Dictionary of the Middle Ages.  
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As I see it, the Policraticus as a whole, and book eight in particular belies a deep 
discomfort with the political workings of the world John inhabited; a discomfort 
that manifests through what is essentially an argument the author is having with 
himself, to no avail.   
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On Limiting Power: King John and Magna Carta  
 
In the years following the completion of John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, 
England, and indeed Western Europe as a whole saw a series of mounting 
tensions between kings and their subjects. It is important to note that as J. C. 
Holt explains, these were not governments that could be called systematic, and 
furthermore, “twelfth century England had no constitution. There was no general 
system of government in which powers were balanced, functions allotted and 
defined, rights protected, and principles stated or acknowledged… It 
[Government] operated in a society in which privilege seemed to be part of the 
natural order of things” (23, 43). Indeed, twelfth century England seemed a 
perfect staging ground for instituting the types of structures and protections 
established in what became one of Western history’s most important documents. 
This is, of course, the Great Charter of King John, or, Magna Carta, a document 
that forms the basis of England’s Common Law, heavily influenced the American 
Declaration of Independence and Constitution, and the Déclaration des Droits de 
l’Homme in France (Shaw, 138-140). In the chapter that follows, I will investigate 
the shift from a lack of systematic government to a tentative attempt to define 
and limit the power of the king as demonstrated by Magna Carta. 
 
 The first iteration of the document we have come to know as Magna Carta 
was, according to its own datum: Date per manum nostrum in Prato quod vocatur 
Rinumedo inter Windelshoram et Stanes / Quintodecimo die Junii, Anno Regni Nostri 
Septimodecimo [Given by our hand in the meadow which is called Runnymede, 
between Windsor and Staines, on the fifteenth day of June, in the seventeenth 
day of our reign] (Carpenter, 69).19 It was not called the Great Charter from its 
                                                            
19 All citations and translations of Magna Carta are taken from David Carpenter’s edition, except 
where otherwise indicated. Here, I have expanded the abbreviations Rinumed’ and Windelshor’ 
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inception, but rather the Charter of Runnymede, or the Charter of King John. 
The title of Magna Carta is due to a scribal error during the copying of the 1217 
version under John’s son Henry III and would not properly stick until the 
publication of William Blackburn’s work in 1759 (Carpenter, 5-8). Although the 
importance of the document I will discuss over the following pages was not lost 
on those present at its signing, none at the time could have known the ultimate 
significance of the Charter. Certainly, its legal importance would not become 
evident until the fourteenth century, when the English Parliament began turning 
Magna Carta’s provisions into statutes (Holt, 10).  
The physical appearance of the authenticated engrossments of the 
Charter of 1215, of which there are four known, is unassuming considering the 
ultimate importance of their content.20 The text of all four engrossments runs 
approximately 3550 words of Latin written on a single side of parchment.  Two of 
these manuscripts are held by the British Library as part of the Cotton Collection 
under their shelf marks Cotton MS Augustus ii.106 and Cotton Charter XIII 
31A, though they are more commonly referred to as Cii and Ci, respectively. Ci is 
the only one of the four to retain its seal; due to extensive fire damage the seal 
has been reduced to a charred lump of wax, and the Charter as a whole is illegible 
to the naked eye. The remaining two engrossments are held by the Cathedrals of 
Salisbury and Lincoln (Carpenter, 3, 11, and 13).  David Carpenter describes the 
four charters, each copied by a different scribe, as follows:  
Ci, Cii, and Lincoln are all in hands typical of clerks working in King 
 John’s chancery. The clerks were using, however, not the most formal  
chancery hand, such as that found in some royal charters, but one a step  
down, a quicker, more ‘cursive’ hand… The hand in the Salisbury Charter  
                                                                                                                                                                         
using the British Library’s transcription of Cotton MS Augustus ii.106 (although this manuscript 
also shows abbreviation in these places).  
20 An engrossment is the final copy of a legal document, in this case the official copies issued by 
John’s chancery.  
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is different from those in the other three Charters. It is far more ‘bookish’  
in form, being similar to those found in texts such as bibles and psalters, as  
opposed to royal documents. (12)21  
The text of all four charters is continuous, with nothing to indicate new 
paragraphs or clauses. Blackstone later divided the text into sixty-three numbered 
chapters, a convention that persists to this day. For this section, I will be relying 
on David Carpenter’s bilingual edition, which uses the Lincoln Charter “since, of 
all the engrossments, it is the most finely written” and Blackstone’s numbering 
for ease of reference (22-23, 32-33).  
The structure of the Great Charter is typical of charters of its day. It 
contains all of the elements one would expect, if not in the expected order. It 
begins with the Intitulatio, or the section which states the issuer of the charter, in 
this case, “Johannes dei gratie Rex Anglie, Dominus Hibernie, Dux Normannie et 
Aquitanie, Comes Andegavie…” [John by the grace of God, king of England, lord of 
Ireland, duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, count of Anjou…] followed by the 
Inscriptio listing those to whom the charter is issued, and the Salutatio, or greeting 
(Carpenter, 36-37).22 We then progress to the expected Invocatio, or invocation of 
the deity, followed by a curiously brief and vague Narratio, or statement of the 
grievance that prompted the charter. The Charter states, “pro salute anime nostre et 
omnium antecessorum et heredum nostrum, ad honorem dei et exaltacionem sancte ecclesie, et 
emendationem Regni nostri …” [for the salvation of our soul, and for the souls of all 
our ancestors and heirs, for the honour of God and the exaltation of holy church, 
and the reform of our kingdom…] (Carpenter, 36-37).23 As I will discuss later, it is 
                                                            
21 Carpenter uses “hand” throughout his book where “script” would be more appropriate. After 
consulting Michelle Brown’s A Guide to Western Historical Scripts, I have determined that the 
more bookish hand he refers to is more likely Cursiva Anglicana, an English documentary script.   
22 To describe the organization of the Charter, I use terms outlined in Clemens and Graham, 222-
239. 
23 For emendationem, The Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources gives “improvement, 
removal of fault, correction” as possible translations. It does also give “moral reform” as a 
possibility, but Carpenter’s use of “reform” seems too strong, and too modern a translation. It is 
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this “reform of our kingdom” that will be of particular interest. We are then 
given a list of names, later referred to in the Subscriptio as witnesses to the 
agreement of the Charter, among them ten of venerabilium patrum nostrorum [our 
venerable fathers] or clerics, including Archbishop Stephen Langton, one brother 
Aymeric, magistri militie templi [master of the knights of the Temple], sixteen 
nobelium virorum [noble men], and alium fidelum nostrorum [our other faithful men] 
(Carpenter 36-37, 68-69). The body of the Charter proposes a series of provisions, 
or Dispositio, consisting of what Blackstone identified as sixty-three chapters 
dealing with issues of money, governance, heredity, and patronage as well as 
provisions for their enforcement (Carpenter, 36-69). After many lines, we come 
to the Charter’s Final Protocol. As stated above, the Subscriptio refers the reader 
to the list of witnesses given in the Initial Protocol, no doubt due to the nature of 
the circumstances surrounding agreement of the Charter; it was not issued by the 
king’s chancery, but was agreed to in the field following final negotiations. 
Finally, we arrive at the Datum cited above, which gives the date and location of 
the signing of the Charter at Runnymede, on the 15th of June 1215 (Carpenter, 69).  
 So, what of the contents of Magna Carta? What does the document say, 
and why did the barons and clergy deem it necessary to make the king say it? It is 
important to make clear, as Carpenter does, that, “The Charter was above all 
about money. Its overwhelming aim was to restrict the king’s ability to take it 
from his subjects” (24). This indictment of the British monarchy in general is 
important because there is a tendency to envision the Bad King John of Robin 
Hood fame as being entirely at fault for the ills the Charter sought to correct, 
and while he certainly played his part, he is not the sole bearer of blame. Indeed, 
Holt asserts that, “If the Charter had any single predominant source, it is to be 
                                                                                                                                                                         
unlikely that John was agreeing to reform his kingdom in the way that we would speak of modern 
reform movements, but instead agreeing to correct the practices that led to the uprising of the 
barons.  
 55  
found in the manner in which the Angevin kings of England exploited their realm 
in an attempt to expand and defend the continental empire of which England 
became a part with the accession of Henry of Anjou in 1154” (24). It is not just 
John’s policies that are in need of examination, but rather the entire line of 
Norman kings in England beginning with William I (perhaps better known by his 
impressive epithet “The Conqueror”).  
Magna Carta was hardly the first charter to attempt the correction of 
kingly injustice. Henry I’s coronation charter of 1100 tried to correct the ills of 
William I and William II (also called William Rufus), albeit unsuccessfully 
(Carpenter, 189). J. C. Holt, likening it to an election address, explains that this 
Charter of Liberties, as it would come to be known, was as much an attempt to 
curry favor among the nobility as an attempt to effect actual change (37). 
Furthermore, while it helped to define the custom (and by extension, customary 
law), Henry I’s charter was entirely without teeth: “The charter remained a dead 
letter, even for those who might have profited from it most. Despite the many 
apparent opportunities, it never became an objective or rallying point of rebellion 
until, almost a hundred years old, it became involved in the genesis of Magna 
Carta” (Holt, 38).  
  Henry I, and his predecessors are not uniquely to blame either, for his 
relatively orderly years as ruler were followed by the anarchic reign of Stephen, 
the damage of which proved difficult for even the highly capable Henry II who, 
“as much as John was the object of attack in Magna Carta” (Holt, 38, 40). While 
Henry II introduced the very popular system of assizes, he was also much reviled 
for his forest policies, as well as the disseisins common to his reign.24 His 
involvement in the assassination of Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, 
                                                            
24 The assizes were any legislation, ordinance, or statute. These would eventually become the 
jurisdiction of the travelling Courts of Assizes. An act of disseisin is equivalent to our modern 
disinheritance. This could be the loss of hereditary rights or lands. See: A Dictionary of Law and 
(Carpenter, 461, 463).   
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was also profoundly unpopular as it was seen to threaten the liberty of the 
church, a complaint that would recur during the reign of his son John (Carpenter, 
191-192).  Also evident in Henry II’s reign are the heavy financial burdens placed 
on his barons as shown in his pipe rolls, a problem that would only worsen with 
the investiture of his son Richard I (called Lionhearted) (Holt, 43). Although 
widely admired for his prowess in battle and his piety, Richard filled gaps in his 
income and paid for his time on Crusade (and his ensuing ransom) by enforcing 
amercements.25  The most common examples of these amercements were the 
fines paid by widows who wished to remain single, or to marry according to their 
own choice, as well as fines paid by heirs to access their inheritances. Richard was 
also responsible for further tightening restrictions on forests, while his volatile 
temper led to disseisins seen as arbitrary and vengeful (Carpenter, 193, 195-196).  
It seems that although rumblings of dissatisfaction were present 
throughout the reigns of these kings, there was little incentive for vassals to 
intervene. Holt explains that, “All this was accepted because the Crown’s 
tenants-in-chief, those namely who could oppose them most effectively, 
depended on these same rights for the maintenance and effective exploitation of 
their own estates. The great men of the land and the king derived their power 
from the same sources” (29-30). These things began to change in the reign of 
King John. Perhaps not so much because he was an especially bad or greedy ruler 
in his own right, but because he inherited a wealth of problems and entitlements 
that, piled one top of the other, could only come crashing down. This is not to 
diminish the problems of John’s own reign. His seventeen years as king, as we will 
see in the selected passages that follow, were marked by major failings of the sort 
Magna Carta sought to remedy.  
                                                            
25 Amercements were financial penalties, or more simply, fines paid to a king or lord for a variety 
of possible reasons (Carpenter, 461). 
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 In primis, are put the interests of the church: “pro nobis et heredibus nostris in 
perpetuum, quod Anglicana ecclesia libera sit” [for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that 
the English church is to be free] (Carpenter, 38-39). The clergy’s disagreement 
over this same liberty of the church under Henry II paled in comparison to 
John’s own “tumultuous and tempestuous quarrel with the church” which 
included, but was not limited to, his own excommunication in 1209 following 
Clement III’s Interdict on England in 1208 (Carpenter, 197-198). It is noteworthy 
that the freedom of the church and its elections appear in first position and that 
the wording belies some remaining tensions.26 After all, these freedoms are 
“concessisse deo” [granted to God] and not directly to the church or any named 
representative of the church on earth. As far as Magna Carta is concerned, 
however, this concession is but the tip of the iceberg.  
 The concessions immediately following (Blackstone’s chapters two 
through six) are tied to questions of inheritance and heredity. That these issues 
should take precedence is unsurprising given the vast campaign of disseisins from 
Henry II through to his sons, Richard and John; as well as the increases in 
amercements for access to inheritance mentioned above. When Magna Carta is 
read alongside the Raoul de Cambrai, these provisions prove the most telling. In 
fact, the central conflicts of that chanson de geste indicate that these problems of 
heredity and inheritance extended beyond the Angevin holdings of John’s reign. 
For example, it is telling that an heir who is of age at the time of his predecessor’s 
death is to “habeat hereditatem suam per antiquum relevium… qui minus debuerit minus 
det secundum antiquam consuetudinem foedorum” [have his inheritance by the ancient 
relief… who owes less is to give less according to the ancient fees] (Carpenter 38-
                                                            
26 The main impetus behind Clement III’s Interdict was John’s refusal to accept the election of 
Stephen Langton as Archbishop of Canterbury. John retaliated by seizing all church revenues 
(Carpenter, 198-199).   
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39).27 Those heirs who accede whilst still underage and in wardship are to pay 
nothing to the king in order to inherit their lands, and perhaps most importantly 
when considering the strife depicted in the Raoul: 
Custos terre huiusmodi heredis qui infra etatem fuerit, non capiat de terra heredis 
nisi rationabiles exitus et rationabiles consuetudines, et rationabilia servitia, et hoc 
sines destructione et vasto hominum vel rerum… et reddat heredi, cum ad plenem 
etatem parvenerit, terram suam totam instauratam de carucis et waignagiis 
secundum quod tempus waignagii exiget…  
   
[The guardian of the land of an heir of this kind who is underage, is not to 
take from the land of their heir anything other than reasonable issues and 
reasonable customs and reasonable services, and this without destruction 
and waste of men or things… And he is to deliver to the heir, when he 
comes of age, his land fully stocked with ploughs and wainages according 
to what the time of the wainage will demand.] (Carpenter, 38-41) 
 
The above passage is a good indicator of the anger felt by the barons over the 
Angevin disseisins. The Charter here resolves some of the anxieties borne out of 
an unclear system of inheritances. While the Charter allows for land to be taken 
care of by a custos [guardian, caretaker] who can expect a reasonable share of the 
revenues during this custodianship, he must return these lands to their rightful 
owner as soon as they are able to take over their duties as landowners. This 
provision is an important step towards maintaining the estates of underage heirs 
and keeping them from falling into disuse or disrepair, while also preventing 
abuse from the custodian. Furthermore, the custos is required to return the land in 
good condition with all the trimmings necessary for its proper maintenance.  
This passage places a burden of fairness on the king (who is not allowed to 
alter the lines of succession to properties), but it also places a burden of good 
conduct on any baron who might find himself in a position of guardianship. To 
my mind, this is one of the first indications that Magna Carta sought not only to 
limit the powers of the king, but also to limit undesirable actions by the liberi 
homines [free men] of what the Charter calls regni nostri [our (John’s) kingdom]. 
                                                            
27 The “ancient reliefs” refer here to long-established inheritance taxes. For example, in the above 
citation, qui debuerit would be the heir seeking to claim his lands, and the person owed relief 
would be the king. See: A Dictionary of Law. 
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This is underlined by further provisions in Blackstone’s chapter four, which lays 
out penalties for sheriffs and other men who abuse wardships sold or appointed 
by the king (Carpenter, 40-41).  
Similar to the system of wards and guardians, provisions are made in the 
Charter for widows who previously enjoyed virtually no formal protections: 
Nulla vidua distringatur ad se maritandum dum voluerit vivere sine marito, ita 
tamen quod securitatem se non maritabit sine assensu nostro, si de nobis tenuerit, vel 
sine assensu domini sui de quo tenuerit, si de alio tenuerit.  
 
[No widow is to be distrained to marry while she wishes to live without a 
husband, provided however that she gives security that she will not marry 
without our assent, if she hold from us, or without the assent of her lord 
from who she holds, if she hold from another.] (Carpenter, 40-41)28  
 
These provisions are borne out of the well-documented fines paid by widows to 
John and his predecessors to remain in control of their deceased husband’s lands 
(and to keep their heirs from being put into wardship), as well as to either remain 
single or marry according to their own desires. In this way, the Charter also 
addresses concerns that widows might be disparaged, or forced to marry below 
their station, as a gift to the king’s favorites (Holt, 54-55). This concern is echoed 
explicitly in the Raoul, when Louis attempts to force the marriage of his sister 
Aalais to Giboin as a means to circumvent the young Raoul’s inheritance rights. 
Although there were still instances of the king intervening in remarriages beyond 
what the Charter allows, “The thirteenth century was distinguished by many 
famous noble women who, profiting from the terms of the Charter, elected to 
remain single, and enjoyed long years of widowhood… The king was also less 
stringent in enforcing his right to consent. As far as can be seen, there was no 
routine system for taking security from widows” (Carpenter, 451).  
 These are not the only payments limited or abolished by Magna Carta. As 
Carpenter asserts, “The rebellion of 1215 was a rebellion of the king’s debtors,” 
                                                            
28 To distrain is to seize goods by force. Though the term seems to have been more commonly 
used for debtors, in this case it refers to obligating a widow to marry to order to keep her 
husband’s lands and revenues.  See: A Dictionary of Law, or (Carpenter, 463). 
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and several of Blackstone’s chapter divisions are concerned with which debts are 
to be repaid, which are not to be repaid, and to whom repayments should or 
should not go (217).29 These provisions state that, “Nec nos nec ballivi nostri saisiemus 
terram aliquam nec redditum pro debito aliquo quam diu catalla debitoris sufficiunt ad 
debitum reddendum…” [Neither we nor our bailiffs are to seize any land or any rent 
for any debt, for as long as the chattels of the debtor suffice to pay the debt…] 
(Carpenter, 42-43). The Charter then goes on to forbid seizure of horse and 
carriage, crops, chattels, or wood from unwilling barons, as well as to extend 
these protections to felons after the period of one year (Carpenter, 48-51).   
 Students of John of Salisbury might have been most interested in those 
chapters that seek to limit the potential tyranny of the king with regard to justice 
and punishment, as well as those that could be said to establish an order similar 
to the body politic. For example, chapter thirty-eight states that, “Nullus ballivus 
ponat decetero aliquem ad legem simplici loquela sua, sine testibus fidelibus ad hoc inductis” 
[No bailiff is henceforth to put anyone to law on his sole accusation without 
trustworthy witnesses brought forward for this] (Carpenter, 52-53). This 
sentiment is followed up in chapter forty-five, which states, “Nos non faciemus 
justiciarios, constabularios, vicecomites, vel ballivos, nisi de talibus qui sciant legem regni et 
eam bene velint observare” [We will not make justices, constables, sheriffs or bailiffs, 
save from those who know the law of the kingdom and wish to observe it well] 
(Carpenter, 54-55). This is precisely the type of structure that echoed John of 
Salisbury’s ideas of governance wherein the king surrounds himself with good 
counselors and prudent legal minds in order to ensure the proper running of the 
republic, with justice at the forefront. Holt explains that these provisions were, in 
part, due to what he calls, “an intense downward pressure in certain functions of 
                                                            
29 Carpenter here cites Holt’s The Northerners, page 34. 
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the legal system” that caused the king’s officials to dip into the pot, as it were 
(125).  
Concerns about widespread corruption and the simple fact that King John 
realized early on that he could use this corruption to fill his coffers was the cause 
of much unrest leading up to Magna Carta.  As Holt explains, “justice was a 
source of revenue. Like his predecessors, John was ever ready to accept special 
proffers from vassals in search of their own particular view of justice” (326). These 
feelings culminate in what is perhaps the most famous chapter of the document, 
wherein John promises that, “Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus, rectum 
aut justitiam” [To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay, right or 
justice] (Carpenter 52-53). Such a provision is unsurprising, given that the king’s 
justice was generally viewed to be arbitrary, preferential, and ultimately for sale 
(Carpenter, 219-234). John should not be held entirely responsible for the 
corruption that Magna Carta sought to correct. The nature of lordship in England 
(and across Western Europe) was such that alongside the king, “The knights and 
gentry were a real political power…They not only did the local hack-work as 
jurors and coroners. They were also called to act at times as sheriffs and under-
sheriffs, or to serve as judges” (Holt, 293-294). Once again Magna Carta was about 
limiting the king’s power as well as making the abuse of position by nobles more 
difficult.  
 This balance of power is complicated when we consider not only what the 
Charter provides, but also where it is silent.30 There is a curious juxtaposition, for 
example, between chapters whose language is explicit in its intent versus those 
where the language is so vague as to seem almost obtuse. The question posed by 
these absences of specificity in the provisions is who is empowered by them, and 
conversely who is disempowered. The most striking examples occur in the first, 
                                                            
30 Carol Symes has begun working in this field, and I greatly regret that her work is yet 
forthcoming and therefore cannot be cited.  
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thirteenth, and thirty-fifth of Blackstone’s chapters. The first concerns the 
liberties of the church in saying that, “Anglicana ecclesia libera sit, et habeat jura sura 
integra, et libertates suas illesas; et volumus observari” [the English church is to be free, 
and to have its rights in the whole and its liberties unharmed, and we wish it so to 
be observed] (Carpenter, 38-39). The second concerns the liberties of the city of 
London in saying, “Et civitas Londoniarum habeat omnes antiquas libertates et liberas 
consuetudines suas, tam per terras, quam per aquas” [And the city of London is to have 
all its ancient liberties and free customs, by both land and water] (Carpenter, 42-
43).  Both of these passages serve to bestow great, unnamed liberties on two 
centers of power that operated largely outside of the purview of the court and of 
the barons; the church, through its clerics and ties to the papacy, and London 
through the financial exercises of the bourgeoisie. How can a charter have teeth 
if it grants liberties that it can neither restrict, nor properly enforce on its own 
merit? Both of these rather sweeping guarantees would require the intervention 
of outside experts in order for the Great Charter to achieve maximum efficiency. 
This is particularly true in the case of London, as it is not granted any new 
liberties and free customs, but rather those antiquas, or ancient ones. Who is to 
say which are the ancient liberties and customs if the Charter does not name 
them?  
The same is true of the church and its jura integra, or unimpaired rights. 
John has essentially been negotiated into a corner where he has given both the 
church and the burghers of London carte blanche. Chapter thirteen goes on to 
extend these liberties and free customs (albeit not the ancient ones) to “omnes alie 
civitates, et burgi, et ville, et portus” [all other cities and boroughs, and villages and 
ports] (Carpenter, 44-45). The Charter, the king, and the barons are by this 
action rendered essentially powerless with regard to any section of English life 
and power that is not centered in the country. Magna Carta thereby restricts the 
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same nobility it was likely meant to empower. The same is true of the many 
chapters devoted to another source of financial power: the merchants. While 
chapters forty-one and forty-two grant merchants both foreign and domestic safe 
travel in and out of England, even in times of war, there is a curious limitation 
placed on them in chapter thirty-five, which states:  
Una mensura vini sit per totum regnum nostrum, et una mensura cervisie, et una  
mensura blade, scilicet Quartarium Londoniense et una latitudo pannorum  
tinctorum et Russetorum et Halbergetorum, scilicet  due ulne infra listas. De  
ponderibus autem sit ut de mensuris  
[There is to be one measure of wine through all our kingdom, and one 
measure of ale, and one of corn, namely the quarter of London, and russets 
and haubergets, namely two ells within the borders. Moreover, for weights 
as it is to be for measures.] (Carpenter, 50-53)31  
Again, aside from the provisions given for lower quality cloths, the only 
measurement standard given for wine, ale, or corn is the quarter of London, or 
London standard. The only way then, that the Charter can be properly enforced 
is by consulting those familiar with the London standard, thereby essentially 
pulling power away from the Charter and placing it in the hands of outside 
individuals.   
 Magna Carta was not, as the 2015 celebrations of its signing would lead us 
to believe, an immediate and widespread success. This may be due in part to 
some of the vagueness of the entries as described in the previous paragraph that 
might have made it difficult to apply the Charter to its maximum potential 
effect. According to Carpenter, there were problems of dissemination to 
concerned parties, problems of enforcement on the part of the king and the 
                                                            
31 The American reader should note that the term “corn” here does not refer to the North 
American maize crop, but rather to any variety of cereal. As for the other items, Merriam-
Webster describes russet as a rough homespun, whereas hauberget is a woolen cloth. 
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barons alike, resulting in the eventual cancellation (374-375, 379-390, 402). The 
Great Charter would see subsequent revivals in 1216, 1217, and 1225 before finally 
creating any sort of lasting legal leverage.32 All this is typical of an era when 
England and its neighbors were trying to mitigate the rising power of the barons 
against the rights of kings. As Holt very handily sums up, “Nowhere is the trend 
towards the Great Charter better or more subtly illustrated than in the 
proliferation and ramification of liberties and privileges. The Angevins not only 
taught their vassals to participate in government. They unwittingly led them to 
believe that they could get the kind of government they wanted” (49). It is 
precisely this trend towards participatory government that Magna Carta solidified 
in the imagination. That said, the Great Charter of King John is not the first 
document to suggest that power should be balanced, or even shared in order for 
kingdoms to be governed effectively. Indeed, as I will show in the final chapter of 
this paper, Magna Carta follows, to some degree, the body politic model laid out 
by John of Salisbury in his Policraticus.  
  
                                                            
32 As one can imagine, both Carpenter and Holt devote many pages to these subsequent charters 
as well as their points of deviation from the original. Rather than giving an exhaustive list, I refer 
the reader to their chapters on the topic.  
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Read, Write, Speak: On Modes of Circulation  
 
Before moving on to the topic promised above, I would like to take a 
moment to discuss the differences in style and circulation of my three primary 
texts. Raoul de Cambrai is a work of epic poetry whose origins remain largely 
unknown. Conversely, the Policraticus has a named author and it is widely 
accepted that the text was intended for intellectuals. Magna Carta, for its part, is 
in both form and intention a legal charter, which on the surface would have 
limited its importance to those concerned with such things. However, I am 
neither convinced that the differences between the three texts necessarily meant 
wholly different audiences, nor that there wouldn’t have been similarities in their 
dissemination and reception. Furthermore, differences in the practices of 
scholarship between the legal, historical, and the literary schools may have caused 
these texts to be segregated when they should be considered as part of the same 
socio-cultural sphere.   
 The medieval reader was more sophisticated than nineteenth century (and 
to a degree, twentieth century) representations of knights and damsels would 
have us believe. The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries were a time of 
unprecedented intellectual exploration prompted by the rise of university centers 
in Paris, Oxford, and Bologna. Furthermore, medieval people had an awareness 
that they were living in a time different from the past that led them to think 
about their role in history and the “perfectionability of society”. There was a well-
documented interest in grammar, rhetoric, and logic (called the trivium) that 
formed the initial stages of university education, but throughout the period we 
begin to see tensions between the Old Logic and the New as scholars sought to 
recover the philosophies of Aristotle, Cicero, and Boethius (Abulafia, 149-158). 
The medieval reader was also very used to the bending of genres as the 
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boundaries between art, philosophy, and science were less rigid than they are 
now. As Copeland and Sluiter explain: 
…it was not only the object to which grammar applied itself, that is, the  
literary texts taught and expounded, that served ethics. The very terms of 
the art itself, the intellectual system that it comprised, was understood as 
a cultivation and preparation of the mind through language. This is an  
extension and late elaboration of the program in the earlier cathedral 
schools of cultivating virtue through learning… (52) 
 Not only were medieval readers impassioned by the gaining of knowledge, they 
could appreciate metaphor and loved a good allegory (28-38, 52). It would not be 
unusual for the medieval reader, or listener for that matter, to glean instruction 
from a text the modern reader might see as purely fantastic. Indeed, if Benton’s 
assertions that courtly literature was, “ as accurate, true-to-life, and down-to-
earth as the authors’ skill and knowledge could make it,” then the boundaries 
between literature for entertainment and instructive texts are necessarily 
mutable. Furthermore, the assumption that medieval audiences were unable to 
discern between elements of fantasy, like the epic stroke, and reality does them a 
great disservice. They were very much aware of the power of poetry to express 
what Benton calls a “double truth” (169, 171-173).  
 The most important tie between these three works is their capacity to be 
performed, or declaimed, beyond what much modern scholarship has allowed. In 
the case of all three of my primary texts, I have found Joyce Coleman’s use of the 
term “aurality”, which she defines as the reading of books aloud to one or more 
people particularly useful as it serves to bridge the gap between silent solo-
reading and professional performance (xi). I will alternate between these terms as 
appropriate, but readily allow that the contrasts between them is particularly 
difficult in the case of the chansons de geste.  
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Modern scholars have often found themselves at a bit of an impasse over 
whether these texts were written to be read, or recorded because they were 
performed, and whether there are significant intersections between writing and 
performance that allow for a greater range in the possibilities of modes of 
reception. An article by Helen Solterer, wherein she cites Hugh of St Victor, 
frames the performance of epic as inherently theatrical. Whether, as Hugh 
describes, they were recited by a single poet, or performed by a troupe of actors, 
props and costumes in hand, the epic has entered into the modern imaginary as a 
grand event at the heart of court festivities (181). While I do not wish to argue 
with Hugh’s account wholesale, I suggest that the enjoyment of epics like Raoul 
de Cambrai was by no means limited to these types of presentations, nor that they 
necessarily constituted their most common means of transmission.   
 In speaking of the chansons de geste as a genre the most commonly 
employed example is the Oxford version of La chanson de Roland. Held up as the 
quintessential chanson, it has become a testing ground for most theories 
surrounding the composition and performance of the chansons as a whole. I 
mention this because none of the scholars I will discuss engage with the Raoul 
specifically, but their theories are no less applicable to it than they are to the 
Roland. All scholars seem to agree that due to limited word separation in Old 
French manuscripts prior to the fourteenth century it would have been necessary 
for readers of the Raoul or the Roland to sound out the word-units to some degree 
in order to understand the text (Saenger, 265-271). The bulk of the disagreement 
between scholars rests on the origins and purpose of the chanson manuscripts, and 
in particular the “Great Divide” between orality and literacy that frames much of 
Coleman’s book. On the one side, Paul Zumthor and Walter Ong argue that the 
manuscripts we know are essentially transmissions, or vestiges of an oral event. A 
jongleur might keep and carry a “minstrel manuscript” in order to refresh his 
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memory, but the text itself was secondary to the performed event. These 
elements of performance also informed any oral features in the written version of 
the poem (Ong, 1, 4 and Zumthor, 69). Paul Zumthor even goes so far as to decry 
the use of the term “literature” as often applied to texts he believes are rooted in 
performance (68).  
 On the other side, scholars like Joyce Coleman take issue with a perceived 
oversimplification of medieval culture that result from  “technological 
determinism”, which draws too hard a barrier between the read and the heard. 
She further disagrees with Havelock and Ong’s assertions that epics are 
essentially data storage, little more than a means to preserve and transmit 
information, calling them, “condescending and reductionistic”. In her opinion, 
the function of these texts, as well as the obvious complexity of their 
composition does not rule out performance, nor does it reflect a style that could 
ever be singularly based on transcription of oral poetry. Coleman is also insistent 
on the impact of written works on the social practices of reading without 
negating the movement of manuscripts into private and semi-private spaces (6-7, 
13-15, 80-81). As Andrew Taylor explains, much of the scholarly conflict 
surrounding the chansons de geste is a hangover from the nineteenth century: “It 
has become an article of faith that the poem was recited by minstrels to largely 
illiterate knights in a series of linked sessions, so that over several days the 
audience might hear the poem in its entirety” (Roland, 36). These sessions, often 
called seances épiques [epic sessions or performances] very well could have 
happened. It is, however, unlikely that these were the primary means of delivery, 
or that our extant manuscripts were destined for the minstrels charged with 
entertaining the knights. Taylor continues by saying, “If we wish to imagine the 
conditions under which the poem might have been delivered more or less in its 
entirety, we must think in terms of someone like the chaplain Gerold, however 
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much this may clash with the clichés of medieval culture we have inherited” 
(47).33 Furthermore, it is more likely that the chansons were performed in small 
chunks, and only periodically. The length of many of the poems would be 
prohibitive both to performer and to listener, as well as to anyone wishing to 
transcribe these performances (as Ong and Zumthor suggest). Taylor aptly sums 
this up in saying, “...a jongleur would be singularly ill advised to attempt to deliver 
Huon de Bordeaux verbatim” (61-65).34 If this is true, then the manuscripts that 
remain to us must have been written for some purpose other than as memory-
aides for the jongleurs. I will return to the purpose of writing, as well as to 
reading practices of the period later on in this chapter, but would first like to 
discuss performance as it relates to my other two primary texts.  
Where there is little doubt that the Raoul de Cambrai could have been 
both read and performed, although perhaps not in its entirety, the question of 
reception is complex in the cases of the Policraticus and Magna Carta. The 
performative qualities of the latter two texts are less obvious. This is particularly 
true in the case of Magna Carta, although, as Carol Symes will argue in her 
forthcoming work, there are elements of performance in the signing and sealing 
of a charter. While the provisions of the Great Charter had been debated for 
some time leading up to Runnymede, there had to be a meeting of the concerned 
parties to agree the final version. Imagine the theatre of the twenty-eight named 
witnesses, King John and Archbishop Langton among them, all standing on the 
marshy terrain with their clerks, men at arms, and servants! The meeting and 
agreeing of the Great Charter would have been a performance in its own right 
with protocols to follow and tensions running high. As plans for the 
                                                            
33 Taylor uses Gerold, chaplain to Hugh of Avranches (a key supporter of William the Conqueror) 
as an example of the educated cleric tasked with a variety of duties, both for business and for 
leisure (45).    
34 Taylor has made a little joke here: The Oxford Roland boasts 4002 lines, but Les Archives de 
littérature du Moyen Âge (ARLIMA) lists the length of the Huon at 10, 553 lines, making it 
exceptionally long even within the genre.  
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dissemination of Magna Carta have shown, the theatre did not end at 
Runnymede. Engrossments of the charter were ordered to be carried through 
towns and villages for inspection. We also know from John’s letters of June 19th 
that there were meant to be public readings, or proclamations, of Magna Carta as 
it progressed to the cathedrals for safekeeping. Whether by official decree or for 
practical reasons copies were made in French and, while there is no proof that 
copies in English were made or proclaimed, there is some suspicion that they may 
have existed. Magna Carta was not just written to be read silently by a privileged 
few. It was intended to be read out loud in village squares for all those who might 
have felt its impact. True, while John did everything in his power to keep this 
from happening, the modern reader should not forget that such documents were 
created with the expectation that they would not languish in archives, but were 
items for public consumption (Carpenter, 374, 378-379 and Holt, 355-356).  
 The public nature of the Policraticus is even less obvious that that of the 
Raoul or Magna Carta. Its length and subject matter makes it unlikely that it was 
ever read out in a town square, or performed at court. There are, however, 
narrative elements to the work that give it a perfomative value more appropriate 
for the medieval classrooms with which John of Salisbury was so familiar. 
Furthermore, the Policraticus uses a series of exempla that were recognizable, and 
accessible to audiences with far less learning than John, a fact that indicates a 
relevance to audiences beyond the social and intellectual elite of his day. Von 
Moos stresses the importance of how John’s use of exempla differed from those of 
his contemporaries by first comparing them to sermons, and then to, “a real 
storehouse of popular examples, a treasure-trove of all kinds of strange and 
wonderful anecdotes…” (214). To liken John’s exempla to sermons and anecdotes 
hits at the heart of his performativity in that his writing is conversational and 
heavily based on storytelling. Furthermore, reading was, as Coleman asserts, a 
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social experience far beyond what she calls the “supposed date of obsolescence” 
in the late medieval period. She further takes to task those scholars who suppose 
that group listening was necessarily done by audiences who were either rowdy 
and boorish, or paralyzed with docility. Rather, Coleman argues that these 
medieval listeners were, “literate, sophisticated people who participated actively 
both with their attention and their response” (xiii-xiv). Therefore, it is not too far 
a stretch to assume that John’s Policraticus would have been declaimed and 
discussed in groups of varying size as soon as manuscripts became available. 
Coleman even goes on to cite John of Salisbury himself, whose use of the terms 
praelectio and lectio (borrowed from Quintillian) in his Metalogicon give an 
indication that he was very much used to the teacher-student interaction that 
saw the one read out, and the other (or others) listen. A teacher engaging in 
praelectio would read to students who would in turn engage in lectio, or reading to 
themselves. Whether this lectio was done silently or out loud is admittedly 
unknown, but it does suggest the possibility of, “reading aloud within domestic 
and other settings...” (35).    
 Perhaps the Great Divide as argued by Ong, Coleman, and others is partly 
centered (if not directly) on why we write things down in the first place. The 
aspects of performance seen above are tied in many ways to the act of writing, 
and to the impact of writing on memory. As Clanchy notes, the Middle Ages saw 
exponential growth in writing and record keeping for a variety of reasons. The 
foremost of these was that the written record was seen as more trustworthy than 
memory alone in matters of business and law. As more medieval people became 
literate the demand for documents (including manuscripts of the chansons de geste 
and romances) increased (44-52, 328-337). It would be easy to draw this correlation 
between increased literacy and rising demand for reading material and leave it at 
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that, but the interplay between reading, writing, memory, and performance is 
anything but simple.  
 The opposition between writing and memory was neither new, nor unique 
to the medieval period. In fact, Plato’s Phaedrus has much to say about the 
diminished value of a written speech when compared to one composed and given 
from memory alone. The irony of Phaedrus being preserved through writing not 
withstanding, Plato describes writing (or written speeches) to be too one-sided to 
have any educational value. Students cannot engage a document in debate as they 
would a teacher and so they can never be truly assured of the document’s 
truthfulness. According to Plato’s fictionalized Socrates, written speeches can be 
amusing, but they can never be taken seriously (277b-278b). This approach to 
writing as transmission of an oral event, similar to that of certain scholars named 
above with regard to the chansons de geste, ignores any reason for writing beyond 
that of the memory aide. Even Clanchy’s term “written record” assumes function 
over form, the replacing of memory with documentary evidence. In the case of 
Magna Carta this is an appropriate term as a record of the agreement was 
necessary in order to hold all involved accountable. So reliant were the barons on 
this particular written record that King John was able to disrupt its enforcement 
by suppressing the dissemination of engrossments (Carpenter, 373-379). Although 
this view of writing as preservation of an event is convenient for Magna Carta, it 
becomes more difficult where the Raoul and the Policraticus are concerned.  
 It is undeniable that preservation and proof are two of the most common 
motivating factors behind writing. However, to focus solely on these is to ignore 
other key elements of writing, among them the potential to push form forward 
and the written word’s capacity to communicate through indeterminate time and 
space (Derrida, 3). It should also be noted that attitudes towards the act of 
writing experienced a marked shift in the medieval period, making it difficult to 
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make any grand statements on the topic. There seems to have been some 
resistance to writing in the Platonian style early on as memory was seen to be 
more truthful – you cannot, as Socrates explains to Phaedrus, read a document as 
you would read a person to determine whether the words on the page are lies or 
flattery. By the later years of the period, medieval people seemed quite content 
with the expansion of study made possible by manuscript culture. In many ways 
writing helps us to remember and to compile information on a scale that pure 
memory could never allow. A work like John’s Policraticus, although the author 
had a fine memory in his own right, is most advantageous to the student in book 
form. It compiles centuries of history and philosophy that would have otherwise 
been incredibly difficult to access.   
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Conclusion 
 
Following the previous discussions of all three works individually, I would 
now like to consider them as a set. To this end, I will use John of Salisbury’s 
theory of the body politic as a means to correcting tyranny as a jumping off point, 
and will pay particular attention to how it might be applied to readings of the 
Raoul de Cambrai and Magna Carta. 
Though the Policraticus is by no means the first work of political theory to 
compare the structure of a nation to that of a physical body – Cicero refers to the 
corpus rei publicae, or body of the republic, in the first book of De Officiis and the 
metaphor of the ailing republic is used several times in his speeches against 
Catiline. It is undeniable that John had read Cicero and thought him pretty good 
for a pagan, so it is unsurprising that he might also have picked up on the 
metaphor (though Cicero is, admittedly, not the only philosopher to ever find it 
convenient). However, the analogy of the body with its component parts is 
worked out in stunning detail in the Policraticus. Through this sort of theoretical 
anatomical drawing, we are given a particularly good picture of the English nation 
not just as it was, but as John thought it should be. That is, as a body which 
moved in a symbiotic chain for the good of the whole, each part with its own role 
to play. From the prince who “locum obtinere capitis, et qui solius mentis regatur 
arbitrio” (Webb, 548d) [occupies the place of the head, and is regulated solely by 
the judgment of his own mind] (Nederman, 69), to the soldiers and sheriffs found 
in the arms and hands, the administrators of the heart and gut, to the courtiers 
and counselors of the flanks, and the peasants at the feet who prop the whole 
thing up (Nederman, 81-85, 91, 104-109, 125-126). There is a top-down model of 
hierarchy to the body politic as John envisions it, but one based on a mutual 
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dependence of the parts and the fulfillment of duty at all levels. Each part has a 
moral obligation to carry out its function correctly for the proper functioning, if 
not the benefit, of the body as a whole. As Sarah Kay explains:  
The hierarchical subordination of parts to the whole relies not on force or  
power but on moral or spiritual value. Hierarchy is not to be confused 
with a chain of command such as might be maintained, for example, by 
force alone; rather, it is the rationale justifying the integration of all the 
links in such a chain to the overall structure. (Chansons, 117)  
Although this framework of rule and vassalage by moral obligation is not entirely 
unique to John of Salisbury, it does seem to represent a shift from the models of 
right-by-might and sacred kingship to a more socially responsible order of 
governance.  
 Within the context of the Raoul, though there is no explicit indication of 
a desire to move towards this sort of social-responsibility version of the body 
politic as laid out by the Policraticus, the simple fact that the systems of power in 
place are not working is abundantly clear. We are given very little to go on with 
regard to certain parts of the body; the feet as occupied by the peasantry and the 
soul which is the domain of the clergy are both largely ignored. We do, however, 
see a lot of the barons who occupy several parts of the body politic. It is perhaps 
here that the social function of the world of Raoul de Cambrai differs most greatly 
from that of Policraticus; rather than each person, or segment of the social 
hierarchy occupying a tidy position within the power structure, characters 
embody several roles. It is perhaps this that makes the power struggles within the 
narrative so messy, for lack of a better term. Although the article itself is a bit 
dated I am inclined to agree with John Dickinson that, “The relation of the 
subjects to one another being conceived as not different from their relations to 
the prince, there resulted the establishment by the more powerful subjects of 
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what practically amounted to political power over their lesser neighbors … every 
lord of a large household was necessarily regarded by John of Salisbury as in some 
sort a prince” (322). If the rebel barons are at once lords, or princeps, of their own 
lands but remain vassals to the king, the body politic metaphor is, in the context 
of Raoul necessarily faulty. How can the body politic model work when the flanks 
and hands of one body constitute the head and heart of another? It is perhaps 
just this question that forms the central difficulties of Raoul’s narrative – it can’t 
work. The only possible outcome is the total annihilation of a generation of 
princely barons with only the promise of more death to follow as each generation 
comes of age. Far from respecting the moral order of things as proposed by John 
of Salisbury, the barons are driven by self-interest and complex systems of 
loyalties which seek to balance their immense power against that of a king who is 
a political machine in his own right. The central questions of inheritance and 
lineage are perhaps actually secondary to this fragile balancing of power that 
takes place throughout the poem’s 8000 lines. The disputes are based around 
inheritance, but it is partly a dummy problem. For, if the structures of 
hierarchical power were clear, and if all the component parts took their moral 
obligation and duty seriously, the disputes could not, and would not arise.  The 
body politic simply cannot work if the central power of the king is questioned 
and if each limb acts without regard for the wellbeing of the whole.  
 Where the Raoul puts all of the problems of medieval governance and 
autonomy on display without proposing solutions for their ills, Magna Carta is an 
explicit move towards defining and resolving the parts of an established, yet ill-
functioning body politic. Much of the Great Charter is concerned with defining 
the duties of the king, his constables, bailiffs, and sheriffs, as well as enumerating 
prohibitions on certain undesirable behaviors. Many of its chapters also lay out 
provisions for those seeking justice in the event that the king’s men continue to 
 77  
misbehave thereby creating a model for social responsibility that mirrors the 
body politic model in many respects. Magna Carta is, as we have seen, not only 
concerned with the actions of the king but also with those of the barons, thus 
furthering the relevance of the body politic model as laid out by John of 
Salisbury’s Policraticus. 
 The most relevant part of Magna Carta with regard both to the body 
politic model and the behavior of the barons in the Raoul are the duties assigned 
to a select group of King John’s barons in chapter sixty-one. The provisions laid 
out therein provide a means to guarantee the charter, and by extension, justice in 
the realm. This is a crucial step from the chaos depicted in the Raoul to a division 
of duties between the supreme head of the body politic and the heads of the 
smaller composite bodies described above. The implication of social 
responsibility is solidified by the provision that the barons concerned will select 
the group tasked with keeping the charter from a pool of other barons:   
...facimus et concedimus eis securitatem subscriptam; videlicet quod barones eligent 
viginti quinque barones de regno quos voluerint, qui debeant pro totis viribus suis 
observare, tenere, et facere observare, pacem et libertates quas eis concessimus, et hac 
presenti carta nostra confirmavimus.   
 
[...we make and grant them (the barons) the below written security: 
namely that the barons shall choose twenty-five barons of the kingdom, 
whom they wish, who should with all their strength observe, keep and 
cause to be observed, the peace and liberties  which we have granted to 
them, and have confirmed by this our present charter.] (Carpenter, 62-63)  
 
The above selection takes the provisions of the charter as a whole and makes 
their enforcement the responsibility not just of the king, but also of the barons. 
This is important not only because it causes the king to share a limited amount of 
power, nor because it explicitly empowers the barons, but because it formalizes a 
system of shared responsibility. Unlike the chapters of Magna Carta that place 
prohibitions on negative behavior, chapter sixty-one ennobles the heart of John 
of Salisbury’s body politic. Using the Roman Senate as an example he says, “Quid 
enim nobilius est cetu senum qui emiriti a uulgaribus officiis ad consilii et regiminis officium 
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transeunt...?” (Webb, 560c) [For what is more noble than a meeting of elders who, 
having completed their service, are transformed from ordinary office to the office 
of counsel and rulership...?] (Nederman, 81). The suggestion that, through service 
and selection, the barons are transformed is an important one, especially when we 
consider the potential dangers that existed pre-Magna Carta for those who tried 
to pull power from the king.  
 In addition to the move toward social responsibility inherent in the 
election of a council of barons, there are other chapters in the Great Charter that 
mirror the various parts of the body politic present in the Policraticus. Of the 
many chapters dedicated to the administration of justice, one in particular echoes 
John of Salisbury’s assertion that not only should there be one rule applied 
equally by all judges, but that “Est itaque primum quod ex necessitate officii utrisque 
indicitur; ut iustitiae in omnibus pareatur et nichil eorum quae facienda sunt, fiat ad 
pretium” (Webb, 568c) [...what is first of all indicated to each by the necessity of 
their duties is that justice is to be served in all matters and none of the things 
which they do are to be done for a price] (Nederman, 93). This is the now famous 
chapter forty, which states “Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus, rectum 
aut justitiam” [To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay, right or 
justice] (Carpenter, 52-53). Keeping in mind that the land disputes in the Raoul 
stem largely from the traditions (however poorly executed) of rewarding knights 
for service and reward on demand, it is interesting to see that what the 
Policraticus suggests, Magna Carta carries out.   
While applying the body politic model is one way of showing how my 
three texts interact, it is perhaps less esoteric than the common points of 
contention with regard to the practices of rule as carried out by good kings versus 
tyrants present in all three. Whereas Magna Carta provided less violent 
corrections for King John’s tyrannical behavior than John of Salisbury would have 
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perhaps suggested, having devoted an entire book of his Policraticus to 
tyrannicide, it is interesting to consider how Raoul de Cambrai’s King Louis 
bridges the gap between the fantasy of the tyrant and the practicalities of rule. In 
the cases of both the Raoul and Magna Carta, it will also be productive to consider 
whether the quest for increased autonomy among the barons created another 
brand of tyrants, with Raoul himself as their figurehead.   
Perhaps more than Louis, Raoul displays the traits of a real tyrant, both 
public and private as laid out by John of Salisbury. His primary fault seems to be 
that he is ruled by his passions and is thus totally unable to control his fits of 
temper. We see him referred to as molt desmesurez [very immoderate] (line 1093) as 
having cuer de felon [the heart of an evil man] (line 2709), among other frequent 
losses of his sens and raison. The climax of this loss of reason begins with the 
orders to sack the city of Origny beginning in laisse 61 and culminating in laisse 
69 where he commands that the city be set alight resulting in the deaths of a 
large number of nuns, with Bernier’s mother among them. Not only does he fail 
here in his duty to protect lesser people, as a good king would, but instead 
annihilates them by vicious means. Further to these cruel acts is Raoul’s refusal to 
listen to good counsel. First, he flies in the face of his mother’s supplication to 
leave the religious people and relics of Origny untouched, then refuses to heed 
her advice to make peace with Hebert’s sons. That he should ignore Bernier’s 
constant attempts to sway him is unsurprising given his position, but Raoul 
refuses even to heed Guerri the Red when even he tries to steer him towards 
peace. If John of Salisbury is correct and tyrants surround themselves with evil 
counselors, then a man who consistently refuses to heed good counsel is also 
tyrannical. He is certainly more tyrannical than King Louis in his acts, although 
less deceitful. Louis’s place among the tyrants is assured by his negligence of law 
and not by violent acts, although there is an argument to be made that it is 
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precisely his negligence of the law that incites this violence. Indeed, Louis’s 
numerous refusals to respect the customs of inheritance are within his rights as 
king, but ultimately acts of tyranny. When the violence spins well out of control, 
Louis does little to reverse the bloodshed. The king also, though consenting to 
marriages is one of his rights, reacts poorly to the marriage between Bernier and 
Guerri the Red’s daughter; a match designed to mitigate the aggression between 
the two families.  
 The presence of these dual tyrants is particularly interesting when John of 
Salisbury’s views on tyrannicide come into play. While I discussed this at length 
in my chapter on the Policraticus, it bears returning to it, however briefly. It is 
John’s views of oaths of fealty that are most important here. As explained before, 
fealty is a promise to God, or before God, that greatly outweighs any promise to 
a mortal lord, and as such most tyrants will necessarily be allowed to live. As all 
the barons in Raoul de Cambrai owe fealty to King Louis, it is logical that he 
should remain untouched. Raoul, on the other hand, is killed by Bernier who had 
sworn himself as a vassal. There does seem to be some disagreement between the 
characters of the piece as to whether Bernier broke his oath and killed Raoul 
unjustly, or whether he was justified in his murder. Sarah Kay is able to offer 
some explanation as to why Raoul’s death may be justified, in saying: “According 
to feudal law, once Raoul has struck him, Bernier is freed from his homage and 
publicly ‘justified’ in joining his father’s [Ybert] army” (Chansons, 75). While this 
explains Bernier’s standing vis à vis feudal law it does not exempt him from the 
religious nature of his oath; Raoul’s killing is then legal, though perhaps not 
moral. However, as established before, given the lack of a properly functioning 
body politic fueled by rampant self-interest on the part of the barons, the 
adherence to laws by all involved is perhaps to be expected.  
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 Curiously, it is the refusal to respect and defend laws that proves the 
major differentiation between prince and tyrant; it is this same concern for law 
that is the concern of Magna Carta. As shown in my chapter on the Great 
Charter, its origins are much older than the rebellion which set Magna Carta in 
motion, As such, it seems logical to look at earlier expressions of what could be 
seen to manifest the same political discontent as expressed by the demands of 
King John’s barons. This also suggests that the weight of the conflict was perhaps 
borne more by dissatisfaction with the structures of lordship – as with the same 
tyrants that were worrisome to John of Salisbury above – than by any one king 
during his own reign (Holt, 1-23). With that in mind, contemporary accounts of 
John’s kingship bear some resemblance to that of Raoul’s Louis. The question of 
sacred kingship, and whether the office of the king superseded all other 
traditional rights afforded to his subjects, as well as the manipulation of law to his 
own benefit reoccurs in the accounts of both kings.  As Holt explains: 
Indeed, in the decade or so before the final crisis of 1215, the Laws of 
Edward and Henry were suitably doctored in order to strengthen the case 
against kings who acted unjustly and without due consent. Hence it is 
quite invalid to treat Magna Carta as a kind of datum from which all 
subsequent departure was unjustified. Magna Carta was simply a stage in 
an argument and bore all the characteristic features of the argument – the 
erection of interests into law, the selection and interpretation of 
convenient precedent, the readiness to assert agreed custom where none 
existed. It was not only law: it was also propaganda. (Holt, 21) 
In this context, it is useful to consider both texts, as Holt suggests, not merely at 
face value, but as propaganda. They are both parts of an ongoing discussion 
which sought to define what the rights and responsibilities of lordship were, but 
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which also sought to redistribute power in favor of the barons, and not with the 
best interests of a healthy body politic in mind.  
A century after scribes recorded the only extant manuscript of the Raoul, 
another set of rebel barons (this time in England) was challenging the authority of 
the king. It is curious that the Angevin King John, who came from a long line of 
such rebellious barons, should be the one to finally enshrine the rights of the 
barons, however short-lived the original Charter was.35 It is therefore 
unsurprising that many of the transgressions that excited the anger of John’s 
barons are the very same which serve to rile Louis’s barons in the Raoul.  Both the 
Raoul and Magna Carta are as much concerned with the correction of bad 
lordship through the delineation of rights as they are with healthy governmental 
function through common action for the common good.  
  Magna Carta and Raoul de Cambrai converse with each other so nicely 
because they represent a similar point of view; that of the barons. I don’t wish to 
speak here too much of intent, as what might seem fairly transparent in Magna 
Carta seems futile with regard to the chansons de geste as a whole, and stories like 
that of Raoul in particular. Without an author it is impossible to discuss 
authorial intent, and even when an author is present, it can be dangerous to make 
assumptions. The story of Raoul de Cambrai is told in such a way as to highlight a 
particular point of view, and as such, a very specific set of interests which 
constitute an early inkling of those sentiments discussed in the Policraticus, and 
which are echoed in Magna Carta. The most important questions are: What is the 
angle from which the story is told, and with whom are we meant to sympathize? 
Once we are able to establish whose interests are best served by the narrative, it 
will be easier to discern the possible politics of the text, as well as how it interacts 
with the baronial interests of Magna Carta. 
                                                            
35 The first rendition of Magna Carta was only valid for three months and was only entered into 
law in 1225 following several revisions (Holt, 1).  
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Although much of the spiteful language and criticism of the Raoul is 
directed towards King Louis, and whilst there is little doubt that he is 
primogenitor of the bulk of the conflict found in the 345 laisses of the poem, he is 
by no means the only lord behaving badly. In fact, much of the Raoul is 
concerned, not with central characters themselves, but with the competing 
claims and legitimacies of its ruling few. In much the same vein, Magna Carta sets 
out to protect barons and their progeny not just from the whims of King John, 
but also from their fellow barons. If, as Dickinson asserts: 
The later Middle Ages were troubled by the problem of reconciling the 
doctrine that, on the one hand, the ruler was the agent or representative 
of the people, and, on the other hand, that he held his power from God… 
In other words, the prince is responsible for the commonwealth, but not to 
it; he represents it legally, but his responsibility runs to the legal authority 
to which he owes his appointment, namely to God. (314) 
 then the study of these three texts as an ensemble is especially prescient. 
Through them we move from the king as largely unchecked where the barons 
fight amongst themselves, to a theory that delineates proper rule, to a document 
that demands it.  
 Following many pages of analysis, I would like to end with a final question: 
Why is it important to put these three texts into conversation with one another? 
They have, after all, been studied individually to a great extent; what is to be 
gained from further exploration?  
 As I said earlier in this paper, the genres assigned to Raoul de Cambrai, 
Policraticus, and Magna Carta, as well as the schools to which they traditionally 
belong have hindered to some degree the possibility of a truly complete study of 
each individual text, as well as their relevance when we engage in a combined 
study. By crossing these traditional academic boundaries, we can achieve a more 
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complete understanding, not only of the texts themselves, but also of the socio-
cultural world to which they belong.  
 Literary texts are often seen as being unreliable historically, though, as 
Sarah Kay explains, they can be demonstrative of the feelings that stem from 
more concrete events. Responding to Matarasso’s reading of the Raoul, she says:  
... the chanson de geste reflects less the political uncertainties of pre-
Capetian France than the baronial resentment at the successful 
imposition of royal authority at the end of the twelfth century. The 
concern which the story reveals with the discrepancy between law and 
justice, and the translation of this discrepancy into issues of marriage and 
inheritance which were central and notorious aspect’s of Phillippe-
Auguste’s policy... (Raoul, lxvi) 
Similarly, when taken as purely historical record, the stylistic markers and merits 
of documents like Policraticus and Magna Carta are often ignored to the detriment 
of all.  
As such, it is crucial that scholarship across what are now called 
interdisciplinary boundaries begins to take a more global approach to analyzing 
the complementary aspects of these types of texts, and of the intersectionality of 
the impact they had in their own time. Through more comprehensive acceptance 
of different forms of cultural output – be they treatises or poems – we can hope 
to have a more complete view of the past.     
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